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Wilfrid Laurier University Faculty of Arts
October 20, 2014
 
 
Canadian Excellence

Curriculum Vitae



DEGREES:

  • Ph.D, McMaster University, Philosophy, 1997
  • MA, McMaster University, Philosophy, 1993
  • BA, University of Toronto, Philosophy, 1990

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:

  • 2010-present Professor, Philosophy, Wilfrid Laurier University
  • 2004-2010 Associate Professor, Philosophy, Wilfrid Laurier University
  • 2000-2004 Assistant Professor, Philosophy, Wilfrid Laurier University
  • 1998-2000 Instructor, Philosophy, University of Calgary
  • 1997 Instructor, Philosophy, McMaster University

BOOKS:

  1. Mental Causation: A Nonreductive Approach (New York: Peter Lang, 2008).
  2. A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2005).
  3. Freedom, Determinism, and Responsibility: Readings in Metaphysics (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003).
  4. Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Mind: A Reader (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003).

REFEREED ARTICLES:

  1.  "Kim on Reductive Explanation" Acta Analytica (in press).
  2. “Do MacDonald and MacDonald Solve the Problem of Mental Causal Relevance?” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel Vol. 41 no. 4 (2013) pp. 1149-1158.
  3. “Reasons and the First-Person: Explanatory Exclusion and Explanatory Pluralism,” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review Vol. 52 no. 1 (2013) pp. 25-42.
  4. “The Failure of the Frankfurt Style Example,” International Journal of Critical Cultural Studies Vol. 10 no. 1 (2013) pp. 35-41.
  5. “Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument,” Erkenntnis Vol. 76 no. 1 (2012) pp. 137-145.
  6. “Are (Some) Qualophiles Contradicting Themselves?” International Journal of the Humanities Vol. 9 no. 1 (2011) pp. 75-85.
  7. “The Generalization Argument, Multiple Realization, and Special Science Properties,” International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences Vol. 5 no. 1 (2010) pp. 457-466.
  8. “Functional Reduction and Mental Causation,” (with Dwayne Moore) Acta Analytica Vol. 25 no. 4 (2010) pp. 435-446.
  9. “Kim’s New Reductionism,” International Journal of the Humanities Vol. 8 no. 1 (2010) pp. 305-314.
  10. “Explanatory Exclusion and the Intensionality of Explanation,” Theoria Vol. 76 nos. 3-4 (2010) pp. 207-220.
  11. “Explanatory Exclusion and the Status of Special Scientific Explanations,” International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences Vol. 4 no. 1 (2009) pp. 115-124.
  12. “Explanatory Exclusion and the Individuation of Explanations,” Facta Philosophica Vol. 10 nos. 1/2 (2008) pp. 25-38.
  13. “Nonreductive Physicalism and the Supervenience/Exclusion Argument,” International Journal of the Humanities Vol. 7 no. 1 (2009) pp. 39-48.
  14. “Why We Should Lower Our Expectations about the Explanatory Gap,” Theoria Vol. 75 no. 1 (2009) pp. 34-51
  15. “On the Social Status of Reasons,” International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences Vol. 3 no. 2 (2008) pp. 105-109.
  16. “On Kim’s Exclusion Principle,” (with Dwayne Moore) Synthèse Vol. 169 no. 1 (2009) pp 75-90.
  17. “Zombies and the Conceivability Illusion,” International Journal of the Humanities Vol. 6 no. 1 (2008) pp. 1-6.
  18. “Explanatory Pluralism,” International Journal of the Humanities Vol. 5 no. 3 (2007) pp. 25-29.
  19. “Explanatory Epiphenomenalism,” The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 55 no. 220 (2005) pp. 437-451.
  20. “Generalizing Qualia Inversion,” Erkenntnis Vol. 60, no. 1 (2004) pp. 27-34.
  21. “Causes and Causal Explanations: Davidson and his Critics,” Philosophia: Philosophical   Quarterly of Israel Vol. 31 nos. 1-2 (2003) pp. 149-157.
  22. “An Inconsistency in the Knowledge Argument,” Erkenntnis Vol. 58, no. 2 (2003) pp. 261-266.
  23. “Supervenience, Physicalism, and Dependence: A Reply to Botterell,” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review Vol. 41, no. 1 (2002) pp. 163-167.
  24. “What was Huxley’s Epiphenomenalism?” Biology and Philosophy Vol. 16, no. 3 (2001) pp. 357-375.
  25. “Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States,” Synthèse Vol. 124, no. 2 (2000)      pp. 239-255.
  26. “Supervenience and Psycho-Physical Dependence,” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical     Review Vol. 39 (2000) pp. 303-315.
  27. “A Problem for the Idea of Voluntary Euthanasia,” Journal of Medical Ethics Vol. 25, no. 3 (1999) pp. 242-244.
  28. “Putnam on the Token-Identity Theory,” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel Vol. 27, nos. 3-4 (1999) pp. 567-574.
  29. “Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism,” Dialectica Vol. 52, no. 1 (1998) pp. 23-39.
  30. “The Standard Objection to Anomalous Monism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 75, no. 3 (1997) pp. 373-382.
  31. "Aquinas' Reasons for the Aesthetic Irrelevance of Tastes and Smells," British Journal of Aesthetics Vol. 36, no. 2 (1996) pp. 166-176.

BOOK CHAPTERS:

1. “Mental Causation,” in The Continuum Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, ed. James Garvey (London: Continuum, 2011) pp. 190-202.

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS:

  1. 2009 “Explaining Away the Explanatory Gap,” Proceedings of the 7th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Arts and Humanities, pp. 338-354.
  2. 2008 “Rosenthal on the Perceptual Model of Consciousness,” Proceedings of the 6th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Arts and Humanities, pp. 2700-2713.
  3. 1998 “Reviving Psychophysical Supervenience,” Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (archived papers) http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Mind/MindCamp.htm#top

PRESENTATIONS AND CONFERENCES:

  1. “The Failure of the Frankfurt Style Example” International Conference on New Directions in the Humanities (2012: Montreal)
  2. “MacDonald and MacDonald on the Metaphysics of Mental Causation,” Canadian Philosophical Association (2012: Waterloo)
  3. Organizer and speaker at symposium on The Metaphysics of Mental Causation Canadian Philosophical Association (2012: Waterloo)
  4. “MacDonald and MacDonald on the Metaphysics of Mental Causation,” Wilfrid Laurier University (2011)
  5. “Are (Some) Qualophiles Contradicting Themselves?” International Conference on New Directions in the Humanities (2011: Granada).
  6. “The Generalization Argument, Multiple Realization, and Special Science Properties,” International Conference on Interdisciplinary Social Sciences (2010: Cambridge, UK).
  7. “Kim’s New Reductionism,” International Conference on New Directions in the Humanities (2010: Los Angeles)
  8. “Reply to Nagasawa on the Knowledge Argument,” Joint Meeting of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association (2010: Dublin).
  9. “Explanatory Exclusion and the Individuation of Explanations,” Canadian Philosophical Association (2009: Ottawa).
  10. “Nonreductive Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation,” Trent University (2009).
  11. “Explaining Away the Explanatory Gap,” 7th Hawaii International Conference on Arts & Humanities (2009: Honolulu, Hawaii).
  12. “Nonreductive Physicalism and the Supervenience/Exclusion Argument,” 7th International Conference on New Directions in the Humanities (2009: Beijing).
  13. “Explanatory Exclusion and the Status of Special Scientific Explanations,” 4th International Conference on Interdisciplinary Social Sciences (2009: Athens, Greece).
  14. “On the Social Status of Reasons,” 3rd International Conference on Interdisciplinary Social Sciences (2008: Prato, Italy).
  15. “Zombies and the Conceivability Illusion,” 6th International Conference on New Directions in the Humanities (2008: Istanbul, Turkey).
  16. “On Kim’s Exclusion Principle,” (sole author) Canadian Philosophical Association (2008: Vancouver).
  17. “On Kim’s Exclusion Principle,” (co-authored with Dwayne Moore) (2008: Toronto) Ryerson University.
  18. “Rosenthal on the Perceptual Model of Consciousness,” 6th Hawaii International Conference on Arts & Humanities (2008: Honolulu, Hawaii).
  19. “Explanatory Pluralism,” 2nd International Conference on Interdisciplinary Social Sciences (2007: Grenada, Spain).
  20. “Explanatory Pluralism,” 5th International Conference on New Directions in the Humanities (2007: Paris, France).
  21. “Exploring Explanatory Pluralism,” Canadian Philosophical Association (2007: Saskatoon, SK).
  22. “Individuating Explanatory Types,” with Andrew Bailey, 5th Hawaii International Conference on Arts & Humanities (2007: Honolulu, Hawaii).
  23. “Explaining Away the Explanatory Gap,” Canadian Philosophical Association (2007: Toronto) York university.
  24. Commentary on “Conscious Unity,” by Paul Raymont. Ontario Philosophical Society (2004: Waterloo, ON).
  25. “Explanatory Epiphenomenalism,” Wilfrid Laurier University (2004).
  26. “Zombies, Zimboes, and Epiphenomenalism,” Canadian Philosophical Association (2003)
  27. “Natural Kinds and Qualitative Content,” Canadian Philosophical Association (A Symposium on Qualia and Natural Kinds) (2003).
  28. Commentary on “Many Explanatory Gaps, One Solution,” by Liam Dempsey. Canadian Philosophical Association (2003).
  29. “Zombies, Zimboes, and Epiphenomenalism,” Hawaii International Conference on Arts and Humanities (2003) (accepted but not presented due to lack of travel grant).
  30. “What’s Wrong with the Knowledge Argument?” Canadian Philosophical Association (A Symposium on Epiphenomenalism) (2002).
  31.  “Not All Qualia are Created Equal: Smelly, Tasty and Touchy Inversions,” Canadian Philosophical Association (2001).
  32. “Revisiting the Inverted Spectrum,” American Philosophical Association (2000)    
  33. “Huxley and Epiphenomenalism,” University of Waterloo (2000).
  34. “What was Huxley’s Epiphenomenalism?” Western Canadian Philosophical Association (1999).
  35. “Huxley and the Epiphenomenalist Hypothesis,” Canadian Philosophical Association (1999).
  36. Commentary on “Dennett and the Churchlands on Blindsight” by Jason Holt. Canadian Philosophical Association (1999).
  37. “Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States,” University of Lethbridge (1999).
  38. “Reviving Psycho-Physical Supervenience,” Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (1998).
  39. “Supervenience and Psychological Explanation,” Ontario Philosophical Society (1997).
  40. “Supervenience and Psycho-Physical Dependence,” Canadian Philosophical Association (1997).
  41. “Physicalism and Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Canadian Philosophical Association (1997).
  42. "Generalizing the Inverted Spectrum," Annual Philosophy Graduate Student Conference (1997).
  43. Commentary on "Davidson, Quine, and the Individuation of Events," by Jason Holt. Canadian Philosophical Association (1997).
  44. Guest Speaker on Donald Davidson for the Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science Research Group at OISE/UT (1997).
  45. "Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism," Ontario Philosophical Society (1996).
  46. "The Standard Objection to Anomalous Monism," accepted for presentation at the National Graduate Student Conference (1996: USA).