

John Terraine

A Study of a First World War Revisionist

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Of all of the British military historians who started writing about the First World War during the "boom"¹ of the sixties, perhaps no one has had a greater influence or generated more controversy than John Alfred Terraine. As G.F. Elliot wrote in a 1965 review, "John Terraine is one of the younger generation of British military analysts who are now proving, with brilliance and vigour, the value of the long view in putting World War I in proper perspective."² It is this idea of perspective, trying to bring balance to the historical arguments concerning the British contribution to the First World War, that drove John Terraine in all of his work. Terraine's nine books on the British Expeditionary Force challenged the comfortable mainstream theories and assumptions, defended the generals, and debunked the myths. His opinions give him both notoriety and influence.

To a certain extent Terraine's influence on the historiography of the First World War exists simply because he wrote so much, but also because much of what he has written runs contrary to the accepted view of Britain's role in the war. Despite his relatively late start as a publishing historian,³ he has proven to be a prolific writer. From 1960 to 1982 Terraine published nine books on the First World War along with several other major works, notably his biography of Lord Mountbatten. During that period he was also editor for Brigadier-General J.L. Jack's diary, and J.F.C. Fuller's *The Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence Upon History*. He also wrote for several journals and is listed as a regular contributor to *History Today*, *Spectator*, the *RUSI Journal*, the *Listener* and *Punch* magazine.⁴ This is a fairly steady pace, an average of better than one book every

two years, but his work does not end with his written publications. During this time Terraine also worked on three major television productions for the BBC and Thames Television. In 1963 he was the chief scriptwriter for the series *The Great War*, in 1969 he did the film *The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten*, and in 1974 he was the scriptwriter and narrator of *The Mighty Continent*.

Quantity is not Terraine's only credential as his works have academic merit. Indeed, any serious study of the First World War must include some sort of reference to Terraine's work. This suggests influence within the academic community, although not necessarily acceptance. One may not agree with John Terraine, but one cannot ignore him.

Although he is best known for his books on the First World War, Terraine's 1960s and 1970s television histories were influential in popularizing military history.⁵ This was particularly true of the critically acclaimed BBC series *The Great War*. According to Tim Travers, University of Calgary;

It is impossible to quantify the effect of this BBC program [The Great War], or the media as a whole, on the writing of British military history, but there must have been a very considerable impact on the audience for, and the promotion of, World War I histories, and military history in general.⁶

Curiously enough, while Travers uses the BBC production *The Great War* as an example of the impact of modern media on the field, he does not specifically mention John Terraine, who won a Screenwriter's Guild Documentary Award for

this production. Rather, Travers credits two other historians, Max Hastings and Corelli Barnett, with building a public interest in military history through film hinting, perhaps, at the controversy shadowing Terraine and his work. Terraine, however, was one of the pioneers of television history and in no small way helped to create a greater audience for military history in general. A wider audience is one of the five preconditions that Travers believes were required before the boom in military history of the 1960s and 1970s could be realized.⁷ Through his television histories, Terraine actually helped to create the writing boom of which he later became part.



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nor create the capacity for independent action because both were outside the existing limits of technology. For Terraine, the resulting war of industrial attrition was therefore historically determined. There was no quick or easy solution to be found to the deadlock, and the British were no better or no worse than any of the other combatants in their efforts to find a solution.

Terraine's second major theme is that the Western Front was where the war had to be won. It was the only place where the industrial,

In order to discover why Terraine is such a controversial figure as a historian one must look at the three major themes that run consistently through his works. First and foremost is his assertion that the First World War was simply the greatest of the three great wars of the First Industrial Revolution, the others being the American Civil War and World War Two.⁸ Only these wars fit his criteria of a great industrial war because at least one or more of the protagonists was in a life or death struggle. To study the First World War outside of the context of a struggle for survival by industrial societies is, in Terraine's opinion, a mistake. This is a theme that Terraine only fully articulates in his most recent book, *White Heat* published in 1982, but the threads run throughout all his earlier works. As he wrote in the *White Heat*,

The interplay of political and military affairs interested me more and more, and has been a large theme in several of my books. [*The Western Front, To Win a War, and The Smoke and the Fire.*] At the same time, economic and technological factors also claimed attention as I perceived more clearly that the event [the First World War] belongs, historically, to a span encompassed by the First Industrial Revolution.⁹

In this, Terraine sought to explain that the British could not break the dead lock of trench warfare

economic and manpower strength of Germany could be broken. An essential subset of this theme is that the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front was instrumental in helping to eventually defeat the Germans. This was done in part by those brutal battles of attrition from 1915 to 1918 that have tended to capture the focus of attention. However, Terraine believes that the real achievement of the BEF was the last 100 days of 1918, when the BEF drove the German Army to the brink of collapse. This victory, he argues, has been largely neglected and obscured by the scapegoating, fingerpointing, personality conflicts and British navel gazing over the earlier battles.¹⁰ Terraine believes that this has led to an misplaced emphasis on the study of the attrition phase of the war.

Terraine remains most disappointed that the BEF's role in the final German defeat has not received the recognition he believes it deserves, and that serious analysis of its success is only now receiving attention. Terraine explains this best in *To Win A War*, he wrote;

So it came about that the greatest succession of victories in the British Army's whole history - victories won against the main body of the main enemy in a continental war, for the *only* time in British history - have been allowed to fade in forgetfulness and ignorance. This was not only dismal from the point of view of the men who suffered and died to win those victories, it was tragic for future history. By robbing Haig and his Army of their laurels, the lessons they had

so painfully learned were wasted, and this augured ill for the conduct of the next war.¹¹

Terraine blames several of the inter-war and post Second World War writers for this obfuscation and clouding of the issue. The most notable is Liddell Hart. According to Terraine, Liddell Hart's overly critical writing distorted the BEF's role in the war, and that his influence was "pernicious."¹² For Liddell Hart was a popular and widely read author during the interwar years, whose views contributed greatly to the ruin of several reputations, most notably Douglas Haig's. Terraine took great exception to this critical view and has sought to provide the counter point.

It follows naturally from Terraine's views of the nature of the war itself, the decisiveness of the Western Front and the importance of the BEF's contribution, that his third theme is consistent support of Haig and British generalship. This is perhaps his oldest theme and is best presented in his second book *Douglas Haig, The Educated Soldier*, published in 1963 only two years after Allen Clark's controversial work *The Donkeys*. Clark, who represented conventional wisdom, had taken his title from a phrase attributed to Ludendorff who described the British army as "Lions lead by Donkeys." Terraine disagreed, and wrote a study of Haig as a soldier and Commander-in-Chief, which argued that Haig was as good if not better than his contemporaries in any nation. According to Terraine, Haig's failure to break the deadlock on the Western Front before 1918 does not necessarily make him incompetent, rather it merely reflects a man caught in his time. As Terraine explained in *Haig*:

It is my belief that such a study can only have meaning through careful attention to the context in which the subject's character was made. Much published criticism of Haig seems to me to lack value because of insufficient understanding or neglect of this context, and of the sheer pressure of successive events.¹³

Terraine's support of Haig is not total, and he does make certain criticisms about Haig's obvious mistakes, and bad command decisions. But on the whole Terraine reflects positively on Haig and in this writer's estimation presents a balanced view: however, not everyone would agree. Liddell Hart chastised Terraine for writing the biography of an "educated courtier."

Since publishing *Haig*, Terraine has remained committed to his interpretation Haig's generalship, and value of his own insights into the general. For example, Terraine attacked Jan De Groot's *Haig* for coming to essentially the same conclusions while almost ignoring Terraine's work of Haig entirely.¹⁴ In his review of De Groot's book, Terraine comments acidly, "it took him eight years of research to reach a glimpse of the obvious."¹⁵ More to the point, while De Groot seemed to agree with Terraine about Haig as man trapped by time and circumstance, de Groot still damned Haig, and his work took little heed of Terraine's arguments supporting Haig. That a major modern biography on Haig by an academic could both ignore Terraine's work and yet reach a similar conclusion speaks to the tone of the debate concerning the BEF and Haig himself - and the tension between the academic community and the "gifted" amateurs in the debate over the First World War.

It was these three major themes - the unique historic circumstance of these industrial wars, the singular importance of the Western Front, and the basic competence (although perhaps not brilliance) of British generalship - that set John Terraine apart from virtually the entire British military historical community in the 1960s. Recently Terraine reflected that he definitely wrote "against the main street"¹⁶ of military thought on World War One. In this sense Terraine is revisionist, and as such his work is of great value for presenting an alternative point of view. As Shelford Bidwell, observed in *Firepower*, "Terraine has attempted to counter-balance a popular opinion that the commander's were all incompetent. His has remained a minority view, on the whole, despite the skill and moderation with which he has presented his case."¹⁷

While Terraine laments that he was never able the sway Bidwell's, nor most other historian's, negative opinion of Haig, he has had success in convincing others that the Western Front was decisive and that the BEF won a great victory in 1918. Both of Bidwell and Graham's books *Coalitions, Politicians and Generals*, *Some Aspects of Command in Two World Wars*, and *Firepower, British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945*, echo Terraine's view that the BEF won the war by hard fighting in 1918:

With these resources Haig was able to play a leading role in ending the war.... the British Army in France fought nine great battles [in 1918], equal to or exceeding any of its operations of the Second World War,...It was not these victories, however, that became imprinted on the national consciousness, but the terrible cost of the battles of attrition that preceded them.¹⁵

Most recently Terraine's view of the significance of the BEF victory in 1918 has been endorsed by the dean of American First World War historians, David Trask.¹⁹

Reflecting on this endorsement of one of his key themes, Terraine mentioned that lately he is feeling less isolated and believes that his opinions are gaining favour.²⁰ However this was not always the case. In pursuit of his vision Terraine has endured some sharp, often angry and occasionally blunt criticism. One is left to wonder what motivated him to write initially from such an isolated viewpoint, and champion arguments that clearly were against the popular opinion. This is best explored by studying his background.

Terraine seems to have been motivated by a desire to cut through all the distortion, innuendo and passionate slander in an attempt to understand the British experience of the First World War. He wrote in his introduction to his third book, *The Western Front* (a collection of his essays and articles, some written prior to the publication of his first book) in 1964, that the essays "mark stages in my own attempt to understand what was happening on the Western front, where our fathers and grandfathers spent their lives so freely."²¹ In fact, Terraine's interest in the First World War and his desire to understand was fostered at an early age. He was born in London in January, 1921. He recalls that the Great War was "a constant topic of conversation and that everyone was always talking about it."²² He also states that as he learned more about it he became increasingly more interested. In particular he wondered why the arguments seemed to be so negative towards the generals, the BEF, and Britain's participation in general, and soon wanted to explore these issues himself. It is unfortunate that none of this insight or detail of Terraine's early life is included in the short publishers biographies available, such as the one glued to the inside cover of *To Win a War* or the one printed in *Contemporary*

Authors,²³ as it would have contributed greatly to setting Terraine and his work in context.

By his own admission Terraine was a good student and a budding writer, and makes mention of winning a school literary award in 1933.²⁴ The prize was a history book that Terraine described as rubbish, typical of that type of history he later attempted to counter. He was schooled at Keeble College, Oxford, where he earned what has been termed as a war degree in modern history. Terraine does not hold a formal degree as would be recognized today and has never taught or held an academic position. He married in 1945, and has one child. He managed to elude service in the Second World War because he was medically unfit. In 1944 he went to work for the British Broadcasting Corporation, spending the next twenty years as a programmer. He worked as both a programmes assistant and a radio newsreel producer, and in 1952 became the programme organiser in the television talks department. He published his first book on World War One, *Mons*, in 1961. In 1963 he became the Pacific service program organiser, but quit the BBC in 1964 to pursue his lifelong interest in military history.

Terraine is an accomplished writer, and his works are for the most part a good read. Comments on his style range from complimentary to damning depending on which book is being reviewed and by whom. His style has been compared to Barbara Tuchman's, author of the *Guns of August*, who also had grounding in the media.²⁵ It is quite possible that it was Terraine's background in television and radio, and as a scriptwriter, which has most influenced the way he writes. Terraine agreed that his style of writing history stems from his earlier experience in radio, but simply states that this is the way he writes and has made no conscious effort to make it so. He is emphatic in his assertion that he is not a journalist nor is his style journalistic, and that this comparison is to be avoided.²⁶

What is, perhaps, most evident is that his background in broadcasting has fostered an approach to history that appeals to a wide public readership. In fact, Terraine does not write for academics, inasmuch as his books are easy to read, although the academic would also find them useful. There appears to be more to this

distinction between Terraine as a popular writer and Terraine as an academic. One is left with the sense that John Terraine has never been accepted by British academia, and it is those in the academic establishment who make up his strongest critics. The reasons for this are perhaps obvious. Although his books are well researched and well written, and are difficult to fault in this regard, Terraine's interpretations clearly buck the accepted norm. One could also add his lack of formal credentials, lack of alumnus, his publishing success, and his own intolerance of other views.

The most notable and the most eloquent of Terraine's critics was the venerable British historian, A.J.P. Taylor. If Terraine was representative of the new young popular historian, then A. J.P. Taylor was the old school. In reading Taylor's reviews on Terraine's earlier works, *The Great War*, and *The Western Front*, one is left with the impression that Taylor considered Terraine to be somewhat of an upstart. In opening his review of *The Western Front*, Taylor wrote;

They say that throwing a child into the water may teach it how to swim. Mr Terraine chose this method when he took up his studies of the First World War. He jumped in at the deep end and swallowed a good deal of water.²⁷

Terraine did not personally know Taylor but does not think that there was any underlying animosity between them, rather that it was Taylor's style of writing which suggests a harsher tone than intended.²⁸ When asked if he felt that he was in some way shunned by the academic elite, Terraine said no, but one is again left with the sense that this too was not always the case. The sharp criticisms from some academics reveals that Terraine is in that uncomfortable position between academic and popular military history.

Tim Travers suggests another way of classifying military history which may be applied to an assessment of Terraine's works. Travers argues that military history can be divided into two major categories, "objective" and "popular."²⁹ According to Travers, objective military history combines analytic and narrative approach, proposes a thesis or argument, and makes objective use of archival sources.³⁰ He states that Michael Howard pioneered such history in the

early post-World War Two years, especially with his call for a wider view of the subject. According to Howard, "military history [had to move] beyond the narrative-memoir tradition, and instead be 'directed by human curiosity about wider issues and by a sense of its relevance to the nature and development of society as a whole'."³¹

On the other hand, the popular tradition of military history, Travers explains, had two extremes. At one end it "simply told a descriptive story."³² At the other it resembled objective history in its use of various primary and secondary sources, and because it attempted to "portrait history from below."³³ In this sense it started to move into the cultural and social aspects that Michael Howard wanted to explore.

Terraine's works do not fall neatly into these traditions, instead they tend to bridge the two, depending on when he wrote them. His first book, *Mons, The Retreat to Victory*, published after almost twenty years in broadcasting, is essentially a narrative style history that tells the story of the BEF's actions in 1914, the first clash with the Germans and the retreat from Mons. It is a compelling story and easy to read. Terraine manages to keep the readers interest throughout and his own comments and assessments are well placed and unobtrusive to the story. The *Times Literary Supplement Review* called it "urbane, but on suitable occasions arresting."³⁴ As his introductory work it was well received, but *it* does not stray to far from the lower end of the narrative popular history tradition. Tim Travers called this book narrative gloss.³⁵ There is little that is controversial in how the "Old BEF" fought and died, and Terraine's book is a cautious treatment of that story. His next book, however, aims straight at the heart of controversy over the conduct of the war.

In 1963, Terraine published *Douglas Haig, The Educated Soldier*. This is Terraine's first biography and it seems oddly placed. Given the broad scope of his later books one asks if it would not have been better to concentrate on Haig at the end. Regardless, Terraine chose Britain's most challenging figure as a vehicle to explain the larger issues, and in doing so also attempted to rehabilitate Haig's reputation. It is in this biography that Terraine introduces two of his major themes, his support of Haig as a

capable and competent commander and his views on the Western Front and the BEF as being instrumental in defeating the Germans. The reviews were mixed. An American review by Elbridge Colby in *Best Sellers* calls it "unabashedly partisan"³⁶ and criticised the book and Terraine for being anti-American. *The Economist* found it thorough but not a lively read and accused Terraine of being too quick to praise Haig. "He [Haig] deserves rehabilitation but not an accolade; and in seeking the first objective, Mr. Terraine has been perhaps a little too willing to award the second distinction."³⁷ *The New Statesman* was even less complimentary:

Mr. Terraine's book is not so much a contribution to our knowledge as a piece of special pleading which merely places a different emphasis on facts which have been known for many years. It is also extremely dull.³⁸

One of the more interesting insights was made in the *Times Literary Supplement* where Terraine's *Douglas Haig* was favourably compared to Duff Cooper's *Haig*, and claimed that Terraine's book could "take its place beside Cooper's as an outstanding biography,"³⁹ as the book made excellent use of the sources available. Travers also considers that Terraine's *Haig* is "pretty good," and that it is well researched, and well written, although he still labels Terraine as an "apologist."⁴⁰ Dennis Winter in his recent book *Haig's Command* also accused Terraine of being an apologist for 'Haig the Butcher'. Terraine counters such accusations by stating that he has nothing to apologize for, and neither did Haig.

Whether it was praised or condemned, it was *Douglas Haig* which created an audience for Terraine's work, and which established him as a historian whose point of view had to be considered. From this point on, his work became increasingly more analytic in nature and began to reflect that wider view of military history championed by Michael Howard.

While all of Terraine's major works on the First World War after *Douglas Haig* reflect elements of this newer method of analyzing military history (which included a social and economic aspect), such an approach is most evident in *Impacts of War, 1914 and 1918* published in 1970. In this book Terraine attempts to analyze and discuss the impact of

the First World War on aspects of British society. As Terraine explained in his introduction;

I am, then concerned... with the impact of war in 1914, mainly at several removes from the battlefield, on the Government and people ill-prepared for such a trial; and with its impact in 1918, chiefly upon soldiers and generals.⁴¹

Terraine's main themes, the decisiveness of the Western front and the role of the BEF, are still explored even though he switched the focus of the material, and the scope of his study. This is also evident in his two pictorial Histories.

The Great War (1965) and *The Mighty Continent* (1977) are not truly analytical in scope. They are what Terraine himself calls "television history"⁴² and tend to include elements of both social and economic history, and analysis in order to appeal to a wider audience. They are books made from the television productions of the same name, large, full of photographs and represent popular history at its best. In Terraine's opinion television history could be immensely successful "because of the great strength of the visual material screened,"⁴³ but he identified their key difficulty in presenting the "intellectual background"⁴⁴ behind the visual story being presented. For Terraine, these books are deliberate attempts to link film and print, and are intended to be complimentary, each filling the weaknesses of the other. *The Mighty Continent* is the probably the more encompassing as it attempts to study the whole of Europe and European man from 1900 to after the Second World War. It is not a specific study of the First World, but many of Terraine's themes are included in an attempt to set them in a greater context. Both works were generally well received, *The Great War* more so than *The Mighty Continent*. In fact A. J.P. Taylor compared *The Great War* favourably to his own similar work, praising Terraine for describing the fighting well, but criticising Terraine for falling short on his description of policy and direction.⁴⁵

It is in Terraine's later books that policy and direction are fully integrated into his major themes, and his works become more analytical, substantial and academic. The first of these is actually his third book, *The Western Front* published in 1964, the vehicle by which Terraine

edited and published some previously written essays outlining his major themes. Being released only one year after *Douglas Haig, The Western Front* allowed Terraine to explain some of the arguments he used to support his study of Haig. Terraine then moved on to develop two of the essays he first introduced in *The Western Front* into major works in their own right. *To Win a War* (1978) expands on his essay "Armistice 1918," and *The Road to Passchendaele* (1977) expands on the essay "Passchendaele and Amiens."

To Win a War had a better reception as it looked at the last 100 days, a subject that had received little attention. It is a good book and the arguments are very convincing. Terraine's essential point has since been accepted, as evidenced by Trask's recent work on the AEF.

The Road to Passchendaele dealt with the 3rd Ypres offensive. Because of the particular horror of this battle and Terraine's attempts to explain Haig's role in its planning and execution, the book was controversial and not well received. It attempted to place one of the great attrition battles in a more favourable light and sift through the existing historical controversy. Of the debate surrounding the 3rd Ypres, Terraine says; "all this verbal mud proved to be as clinging as the notorious mud of Flanders."⁴⁶ Terraine made the case that 3rd Ypres was not an unnecessary battle and in fact was instrumental in keeping the Coalition intact during the French mutinies. He was nonetheless critical of how Haig fought the battle⁴⁷, but no more critical than his earlier treatment of Haig in the biography.

The Road to Passchendaele is comparable to Terraine's other books, but it is the subject, like Haig, which acts as a lightning rod for criticism. For example while Tim Travers finds the majority of Terraine's work on the First World War "derivative,"⁴⁸ he reserves his strongest criticism for *The Road to Passchendaele*, which he calls weak. He is critical of Terraine's reliance on secondary sources in this book in particular, and is quite damning of the lack of primary source material in virtually all of Terraine's books. This is a harsh criticism but in this author's opinion not entirely accurate. A survey of Terraine's bibliographies and footnotes shows that Terraine does use primary sources but often fails to document their use to a standard that is

more academically acceptable. *The Road to Passchendaele* is a good example, where there is no formal bibliography nor formal footnotes or endnotes. Rather Terraine uses a half page "Notes on Sources" at the beginning and endnotes after each particular chapter. While this is unconventional, it does give the reader immediate knowledge of the source, and on the whole these notes seem to be a good mixture of both primary and secondary sources.

Terraine's last two books on the First World War are his most analytical. In both of these he continues his major themes but again changes the scope and context. In *The Smoke and the Fire* he does a successful and convincing job of debunking several of the myths that surround the First World War. The most notable is his attempt to counter the myth that the tank was the decisive arm in the victories of 1918. Against this he creates the anti-myth that it was artillery, specifically the British artillery that was the decisive arm. To illustrate that his arguments develop over time, Terraine explained that he used to very much believe in the tank myth. Quite possibly a result of his earlier close association with Fuller. But now he believes that it was British gunnery and fire planning which proved to be overwhelming and decisive.⁴⁹ Here he seems to have been influenced by another close friend, Shelford Bidwell, who along with Dominick Graham also advanced this notion of the supremacy of artillery in their book, *Firepower*.

There may be more to this connection. Terraine's last book, *White Heat* is where he finally articulates his biggest theme, and discusses the impact that the industrial revolution and technology had on the First World War. It was published the same year as Bidwell and Graham's *Firepower*, which discusses a similar theme. They are very much complimentary works. It would seem in the end that John Terraine was right on at least two of his major themes. Both having been supported and embraced by recent authors, and academics. Consensus on Haig, however, seems impossible.

Much of the controversy that surrounds John Terraine is undeserved. When his work is placed in a larger historical context, his arguments and thesis appear to be consistent, forceful, convincing and above all balanced. He is to be admired for his conviction in the face of what

must, at first, have seemed to have been an overwhelming majority opinion against his arguments. That he has stuck with it for over three decades speaks volumes. It is these attributes that have won him his influence. John Terraine's work is essential to any balanced study of the First World War and any work that does not include him is probably incomplete. At 75, John Terraine should get immense satisfaction from knowing that his essential points are finally beginning to win wider acceptance, and knowing that he can be counted amongst those authors who have made an important contribution to the study of the First World War.

Notes

1. D. Charters, M. Milner, and J.B. Wilson, *Military History and the Military Profession* (Westport: Praeger, 1992), p.35.
2. Review of *The Western Front*, *BookReview Digest*, 1965, p. 1235.
3. Elliot described him in 1965 as a "young" historian, but his first book *Mons*, was published in 1960, when he was 39.
4. International Authors and Writers, 1971.
5. Charters, p.38.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Charters, rj.35. Travers' five preconditions necessary for the boom in the 1960s are; 1. War Memoirs and war stories; 2. The creation of an audience through popular bestsellers and television history; 3. The influence of prevailing war culture; 4. The opening of archives and war records; and, 5. The involvement of academia.
8. John Terraine, *White Heat* (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1982), pp.6, 7, 328.
9. *Ibid.*, p.6.
10. Telephone Interview, John Terraine and author, 16 November 1996. Terraine believes that most of the controversy over Britain's experience in World War I is self inflicted. He relates the story of when he was asked to recently participate in a debate *Haig: For or Against*, he lead off by stating that this would only be a debate in England. In France, he says, they would have asked who Haig was.
11. John Terraine, *To Win A War* (London: Sedgewick and Jackson, 1978), p. 14.
12. Telephone Interview, Terraine.
13. John Terraine, *Douglas Haig* (London: Hutchinson, 1963), p.xv
14. John Terraine, "Douglas Haig 1861-1928: A Review Article," *British Army Review*, August 1989; G.J. De Groot, *Douglas Haig 1861-1928* (London: Unwin Hyman), 1989. Terraine writes that after eight years of research to arrive at that deduction, De Groot had spent a long time on a blinding glimpse of the obvious.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Telephone interview, Terraine.
17. S. Bidwell, and D. Graham, *Firepower* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1982), p.299. Terraine and Bidwell were close friends, and Terraine reflected sadly on Bidwell's recent death.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
19. See Trask's *The AEF and Coalition Warmaking 1917-1918*, University of Kansas, 1993, especially Chapter 8.
20. Telephone Interview, Terraine.
21. John Terraine, *The Western Front* (London: Hutchinson, 1964), p. 19.
22. Telephone Interview, Terraine.
23. L. Mietzer, ed., *Contemporary Authors*, Vol 13. (Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1983).
24. John Terraine, *Smote and the Fire* (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1980), p. 14. The prize was Moodie's, *The Crown of Honour: Being Stories of Heroism, Gallantry Magnanimity and Devotion from the Great War of 1914-18*.
25. Telephone Interview, Tim Travers and author, 6 November 1996. When told in a subsequent interview that his work had been compared to Barbara Tuchman's, Terraine simply commented, "Oh dear!".
26. Telephone Interview, Terraine. I tried to suggest that Terraine's style had a journalistic quality, the obvious result from having been a journalist. Terraine emphatically denied that he was a journalist or wrote in a journalistic style.
27. A.J.P. Taylor, "Old Bill," *The New Statesman*. 26 June 1964, p.995.
28. Telephone Interview, Terraine.
29. Charters, pp.37-39.
30. *Ibid.*, p.34.
31. *Ibid.*, p.38.
32. *Ibid.*, p.37.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Book Review Digest*, 1961, p. 1403.
35. Telephone Interview, Travers.
36. *Book Review Digest*, 1963, p.988.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. "The Victor," *Times Literary Supplement*, 31 May 1963, p.383.
40. Dennis Winter, *Haig's Command* (London: Viking, 1992), p.323. Winter labels all writings on Haig as either apologist, supportive of Haig, or protagonist, condemning of Haig.
41. John Terraine, *Impacts of War, 1914 and 1918* (London: Hutchinson, 1970), p.v.
42. John Terraine, *The Mighty Continent* (London: Leo Cooper, 1977), p.7.
43. *Ibid.*, p.8.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Book Review Digest*, 1965, p.1235.
46. John Terraine, *The Road to Passchendaele* (London: Leo Cooper, 1977), p.xxi.
47. *Ibid.*, p.339.
48. Telephone Interview, Tim Travers. In response to questions concerning Dr. Travers' essay in Charters, et al. *Military History and the Military Profession* 1992.
49. Telephone Interview, Terraine.

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