

Operations of 1 Canadian Infantry Divisional Artillery 24 August - 22 September 1944

In January 1944 1st Canadian Infantry Division reverted to command of I Canadian Corps after seven months of campaigning in Sicily and Italy under a British Corps. The story of the division's resentment toward the level of paperwork foisted on them by H.D.G. Crerar's untried corps headquarters is legendary. Modern military historians assume this rancour is indicative of a 1914-18 mindset among Second World War Canadian senior officers which prevented them from adapting to the fast-paced nature of modern mechanized warfare in the 1940s.¹ Ironically, much of that "paper-pushing" appears to have contributed to the Canadian Army's victories over German forces in the great battles of 1944-45.

Among the most labourious administrative chores were the operational narratives and lessons learned reports requiring battle participants to analyze recent actions and draw conclusions for improving combat efficiency. These reports do indeed date back to the Great War. Most First World War historians agree that such documents were a key ingredient to the remarkable success of the Canadian Corps in 1915-1918.²

The following report was prepared by the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery staff in late September 1944, during the brief pause between the breakthrough of the Gothic and Rimini Lines and the subsequent pursuit into the Po Valley. In the weeks prior to that pause, I Canadian Corps suffered

their heaviest losses to date against the most determined German resistance encountered during the Italian Campaign. They also demonstrated remarkable military skill and professionalism, and won their greatest victories of the entire war.

Readers may note that the report is tightly focussed on exacting every possible ounce of combat power out of an already effective organization. Continual refinements to the Anglo-Canadian system were essential given that Allied forces in Italy usually possessed the barest minimum of resources necessary to accomplish their strategic mission of preventing German formations from withdrawing to more decisive fronts. Similar reports are found in the war diaries of all units and formations in the Canadian Army in the Second World War. What is most significant about this process is the rapidity with which recommended improvements were put into practice during subsequent operations.

Lee Windsor

Notes

1. J.L Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: 1993), pp. 107-108.
2. Shane Schreiber, *Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the last 100 days of the Great War* (Westport: 1997).

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Commander, Royal Artillery 1st Canadian Infantry Division

Introduction

1. During the period 24 August - 22 September 1944, 1 Cdn Inf Div completed the operation to capture RIMINI and thus assisted in securing an entry into the PLAINS of LOMBARDY.
2. At the outset this operation, due to various conditions of terrain and anticipated enemy

strategy, was divided into four phases, which in effect, were to form one continuous operation:

Phase I - To assault across R METAURO and establish bridgeheads and crossings.

Phase II - To advance from R METAURO to R FOGLIA.

Phase III - To break through the GOTHIC LINE.

PHASE IV - To advance and capture RIMINI.

Later, as events show, the operation included a Phase V.

3. The role of Artillery, 1 Cdn Inf Div was to supply direct support to the division for the operation, and to assist in the support of operations by flanking formations.

Phase I

The Assault Across R METAURO and the Establishment of Bridgeheads and Crossings

4. By 24 August 1944, 1 Cdn Inf Div was grouped behind a cavalry force of the Polish Corps, prepared to conduct the operation of establishing a bridgehead across the R METAURO. This was to be done in two stages with two brigades each with two battalions up, with 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade (1 Cdn Inf Bde) right, 2 Cdn Inf Bde left, 3 Cdn Inf Bde in reserve and 21 Army Tank Bde Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) in support. The first stage was to be a silent infantry attack across the R METAURO to the VIA FLAMINIA, an ideal start line for the second stage. This was to be a co-ordinated two brigade attack to the bridgehead objective approximately 3000 yards beyond the highway, and was to be supported by an intense artillery program.

5. An appreciation for the artillery plan indicated the following:

- (a) the ground occupied by the enemy was very rugged.
- (b) the terrain on the enemy held side was in four distinct ridges, thus lending itself to four separate and distinct lines of attack.
- (c) there was an abundance of information on known enemy positions and localities.

Therefore it was considered that a series of concentrations and linear targets would most suitably deal with the situation. These concentrations were in belts 400 to 500 yards in depth, and timed to agree with the proposed rate of advance of the infantry. A belt of pre-arranged defensive fire (DF) tasks was drawn up to coincide with the outside perimeter of the

bridgehead. Flanking neutralization was co-ordinated with the flanking divisions. Concentrated counter mortar and counter battery programs were also incorporated into the fire plan. All details were complete and the plan was issued at 1200 hours 25 August 1944 for H-hour at 2359 hours, thus affording sufficient time for detailed study by infantry and formation commanders.

6. During the night 23/24 August 1944 regiments of the divisional artillery, including 24 Army Field Regiment (Self Propelled) (24 A Fd Regt (SP)) RA under command, moved into camouflaged positions to support the attack. One troop of 2 Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (2 Cdn LAA Regt) was deployed with each field regiment. Batteries from 1 Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment (1 Cdn A Tk Regt) were with their affiliated brigades. 15 and 111 Cdn A Tk Btys were under command to support the armour.

7. The silent crossing of the R METAURO was completely successful. At 2359 hours 25 August 1944 the artillery program commenced with all the artillery resources of 1 Cdn Inf Div. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 4 Brit Inf Div and some Polish Artillery participating. Control of this fire plan was comparatively easy and was maintained at HQ RCA. The attack moved forward as scheduled.

8. By 0615 hours 26 August 1944 the two brigades were secure in their bridgehead. Crossings had been prepared and the armour and supporting arms were moving forward. It was later discovered that the enemy had commenced withdrawing just prior to H-hour. As a result the artillery fire came down on his forces in the open, and inflicted terrible casualties.

Phase II

The Advance from R METAURO to R FOGLIA

9. The task of the division now was to advance with all speed to the R FOGLIA, feel out the defences of the GOTHIC LINE and, if possible, break through before the enemy's prepared defences could be completely manned. The two leading brigades were ordered out of the bridgehead at 0730 hrs 26 August 1944, 3 Cdn

Inf Bde still being held in reserve. This was carried out by 1 Cdn Inf Bde on the right, and 2 Cdn Inf Bde on the left. Both advances were supported by armour from 21 Army Tank Bde RAC.

10. The terrain over which this phase was to be conducted, was rolling and barren, and afforded very little cover. Poor secondary narrow road and numerous enemy demolitions created considerable delay in forward movement of transport and supporting arms. Tanks however, were able to move easily and freely. A few prominent features did, however, lend themselves to defence by the enemy, but the same features, when in our hands, afforded excellent observation points.


11. The role of the artillery in this phase could not be clearly defined by any set piece fire plan, and control of fire was decentralized to some extent, in order that continuous and rapid support might always be available as and when required.


12. Fire plans were numerous, spontaneous and simple. Those requiring a heavier weight of fire than could be adequately handled by one regiment, or requiring the weight of Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) were referred to me. At times fire plans requiring the weight of the whole divisional artillery or more, were drawn up and controlled from my vehicle parked by the side of the road. Speed was the essential factor throughout.

13. Movement of guns required close consideration. Gun areas were generally chosen from a study of aerial photographs. Immediately an area was declared safe for recce by my forward reps at brigades, recce parties were dispatched. Moves were arranged through division. Generally regiments were moved complete and were located in their new positions

in a matter of from two to five hours. On 26 August 1944 I moved all four regiments under my command across the R METAURO. On the 27 August 1944 I moved two, on the 28 August 1944 the other two, and on the following day all four were again moved to a final position for the assault on the GOTHIC LINE. Regiments at all times were kept as far forward as the speed of the infantry advance would permit.

14. Continuous close support was at all times maintained. When a regiment engaged in the close support of an attacking brigade was





Medium Gun Position by Lawren P. Harris

ordered to move, it became necessary that some other regiment take over its commitment. This was done by a regiment not committed, putting wireless sets on the frequencies of that which was ordered to move. At all times the forward observation officers and the infantry could call for fire as required.

15. When not engaged in actual support of the advance, harassing fire was emphasized, more particularly when we came within range of the R FOGLIA. On the night 28 August 1944, intelligence reported the enemy to be withdrawing his guns and equipment across the river. A very heavy harassing fire (HF) program covering all river crossings as well as adjacent roads and paths of exit from the GOTHIC LINE, was drawn up. The fire continued throughout the night. The following day an intense HF program on known enemy localities and likely supply and maintenance routes was started, to reach its climax just before H-hour for the attack on the GOTHIC LINE.

16. Artillery liaison for this phase remained as it had been originally at the commencement, and as it would continue throughout this operation:

(a) An exchange of liaison officers between Artillery 1 Cdn Inf Div, Artillery 1 Cdn Corps, 1 Cdn AGRA and the Artillery HQs of the flanking divisions.

(b) Within our own formation; one Commander Royal Artillery's (CRA's) rep and three CO's reps with each brigade; one Forward Observation Officer (FOO) with each battalion; plus one CO's rep from 1 Cdn AGRA with each brigade HQ. This allotment was augmented as necessary, from time to time but only for short periods.

Close liaison such as this completely facilitated either decentralized or centralized control.

17. This phase of the operation was completed according to plan. 2 Cdn Inf Bde was successful in gaining the high ground overlooking R FOGLIA and was relieved on the night of 28/29 August 1944 by 11 Cdn Inf Bde. On the right 1 Cdn Inf Bde was consolidated approximately 3000 yards this side of the river. The 48th Highlanders of Canada later gained the high ground overlooking the river. The relief of 1 Cdn Inf Bde by 3 Cdn Inf Bde was completed by the morning 30 August 1944. Throughout this entire phase the advance

of the artillery had conformed with the advance of the infantry and support was always maintained.

Phase III

The Break-through the GOTHIC LINE and the Pursuit to the R CONCA

18. 1 Cdn Inf Div was now faced up to the GOTHIC LINE with two brigades up, on the right 3 Cdn Inf Bde, on the left 2 Cdn Inf Bde, in reserve 1 Cdn Inf Bde, with 21 Army Tank Bde in support. The task of the division now was to assault and effect a break-through of the GOTHIC LINE; to form a bridgehead across the R FOGLIA and then advance as rapidly as possible to the R CONCA. This effort coincided directly with the task of 5 Cdn Armd Div who had taken over the left sector of the divisional front as in Phase II. Intermediate objectives were, for 1 Cdn Inf Div MONTE LURO (0180), for 5 Cdn Armd Div TOMBA di PESARO (9979).

19. The rolling barren terrain continued with the feature MONTE LURO completely commanding the entire sector, both back to the R FOGLIA and forward to the R CONCA. Roads, although of a secondary nature, improved as the ADRIATIC was approached. Once reached, Highway 16, a first class road, would afford an all weather supply route through CATTOLICA (9886), PESARO (1280) and FANO (2173).

20. On the night 29/30 August 1944, while the relief of 1 Cdn Inf Bde was being completed, 3 Cdn Inf Bde sent out patrols to recce both sides of R FOGLIA for crossings, approaches and exits. The following day the West Nova Scotia Regiment was ordered across the river. After some difficulty with mines and machine guns they did establish themselves over the river, followed on 31 August 1944 by the Royal 22e Regiment. 3 Cdn Inf Bde was thus successful in securing the lateral road across the R FOGLIA by morning 1 September 1944.

21. 2 Cdn Inf Bde was progressing more rapidly on the left, and by the night 31 August 1944 was approaching POZZO ALTO (026778). This point was taken the following morning and the advance continued towards MONTE LURO (0117808). This feature fell to the Loyal Edmonton Regiment on 2 September 1944.

22. On the right 3 Cdn Inf Bde was now conforming with this advance, while still farther over the Polish Corps too, were moving through the GOTHIC LINE. The GOTHIC LINE defences had been breached.

23. The Royal Canadian Dragoons at this point under command 21 Tank Bde were exploiting towards the ADRIATIC on the divisional axis. During the late afternoon 2 September 1944 they reached the sea at a point near the mouth of the R CONCA. On the night 2/3 September 1944 consolidation of gains was carried out and by early morning 3 September 1944 1 Cdn Inf Div was firmly faced up to the R CONCA.

24. Since the beginning of Phase II of this operation, intensive artillery research and planning had been going on in anticipation of a formal set piece attack on the GOTHIC LINE. Accurate information on enemy localities and movement was gathered daily from, air photo interpretation, defence overprints, reports from partisans and prisoners of war. This was all collated and transcribed on a large mosaic air photo at my headquarters. From this was deduced an intense counter preparation and harassing fire program which was started on the morning of 30 August 1944 and which continued until cancellation, due to the proximity of our own troops. The targets for the fire plan to support the anticipated large scale co-ordinated attack consisted of various series of linear and pinpoint concentrations and were selected from this information. The intended fire plan however did not progress beyond this point. However these selected targets were of great value to both myself and my reps in affording an abundance of positive targets for close support and impromptu fire plans.

25. As a result of the unexpected break-through, the artillery supplied close support rather than predicted set piece fire plan support. Opportunity shoots were frequent. These shoots varied in size from troop targets to a "V" target on GABICCE (0186) during the afternoon of 2 September 1944. We designed a very concentrated impromptu fire plan in support of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment's attack on MONTE LURO (017808). This was a series of heavy concentration on a time program by field, medium and heavy guns. The program was fired and remained on call as long as it was required.

26. Much movement and speed of movement was again essential in supplying continuous support. Two field regiments were moved forward three times, one field regiment twice, the SP regiment twice, and one medium regiment was deployed, all within the short period of the advance. Continuous support was maintained at all times.

27. Harassing fire varied from the violent type of the counter preparation program to practically nil in the latter stages of this phase, due to the gradual decrease in the supply of detailed information on known enemy localities, and also due to the fact that the rapid movement of regiments would not permit as great a weight of artillery to be used.

28. As the battle moved more rapidly, 24 Fd Regt (SP) RA was placed under command 21 Tank Brigade. 5 Cdn Med Regt from 1 Cdn AGRA and an Assistant Counter Battery Staff from 1 Cdn Corps were placed under my command. Thus I was afforded the support of a counter battery staff and a med regt should CBO and AGRA drop too far behind. The tank brigade was afforded the support of a field regiment should divisional control of fire prove impracticable.

29. The breaching of the GOTHIC LINE and the advance to the R CONCA had been achieved with greater ease than anticipated. Phase III in all respects had been a complete success.

Phase IV

The Advance to the R MARANO

30. To conform with the original plan of the operation, 1 Cdn Inf Div was to attack on the right sector of the Corps front along the axis Highway 16 and capture RIMINI (8597). The first stage of this attack was to be the establishment of a bridgehead over the R CONCA and to continue the advance to the R MARANO and then to continue along the coastal axis. This plan was to be executed initially by the gaining of the bridgehead by the Royal Canadian Dragoons, later to be taken over by the Royal Canadian Regiment. Then the remainder of 1 Cdn Inf Bde were to pass through and continue the advance to the R MARANO.


31. The terrain over which this advance was to take place, on initial study, might appear to be

far less difficult to traverse than that over which we had just passed. On closer examination however it was found to be tactically far more difficult than any ground previously encountered. Ahead, and within the divisional boundary, was the rolling ground across the R CONCA for approximately 5000 yards following which it gently sloped to the R MARANO - a distance of approximately another 5000 yards. The latter was entirely barren and completely under observation from both the SAN LORENZO - SAN MARTINO feature on the opposite side of the R MARANO. and the SAN FORTUNATO feature which entirely commanded observation of the entire divisional front. These two features were separated by still another river - the R AUSA. The axis although not rugged was most difficult.

32. The high and rugged hills on the left to which our flanking Corps (5 Corps) had been unable to penetrate, afforded complete observation of our front at all times. It was apparent, before this phase had been long under way, that the completion of our task would be most difficult unless 5 Corps attacked first and secured the high ground on their front.

33. In this respect it was found necessary to reorganize the plan for both 5 British Corps and 1 Cdn Corps. The plan was revised to include another phase for 1 Cdn Corps, plus a containing action to be included in this phase. While 5 Corps advanced on our left considerable regrouping of our forces was carried out.

34. On the night of 2/3 September 1944 the Royal Canadian Dragoons had pushed across the R CONCA forming a bridgehead into which followed the Royal Canadian Regiment and later the remainder of 1 Cdn Inf Bde. The brigade advanced out of the bridgehead towards the R MARANO against very heavy opposition. The advance continued on the left to higher ground on this side of the river, but on the right was stopped before SAN LORENZO (904913) was reached. The Royal Canadian Dragoons continued along the coast as far as RICCIONE (923904). Progress was slow and no outstanding advances were made. 3 Cdn Inf Bde was moved across the R CONCA in rear of 1 Cdn Inf Bde on 9 September 1944 and thence advanced westerly approximately two to three thousand yards. At this point the division consolidated on a line



"Auster III, Air Observation Post, Advanced Landing Ground" by Lawren P. Harris
Near Ceprano, on a field formerly used as a German anti-aircraft site, Auster III planes of "A" Flight, 657 Air Observation Squadron, RAF during operations in support of First Canadian Corps.

904912-893902 preparatory to continuation of the operation as outlined in the revised Corps plan.

35. The entire resources of the divisional artillery were placed at the disposal of 1 Cdn Inf Bde for this advance. Although on different occasions impromptu fire plans were conducted, both from brigade and division, nothing of a set piece nature was produced. In general the support afforded flexibility; and centralization of control where it could best be controlled was my aim.

36. The Air Observation Post at this time, and from this time, became more valuable with each succeeding day. Primarily it was a source of information and secondly it proved almost the only means by which observed shooting could be carried out. The ground afforded no observation that could in any way approach that made possible by the Air Observation Post. In addition to these normal roles however a diversion was supplied to these flying gunners.

The navy provided destroyers and AGRA provided 7.2-inch guns with which they conducted many observed destructive shoots. Truly in this and the succeeding phase of the operations the Air Observation Post became the "eyes of the Artillery."

37. The positions which the enemy had chosen to defend proved almost entirely to be strongly constructed Italian houses. Field and medium concentrations proved of little value in silencing or destroying these positions. The heavy FOOs together with the Air Observation Post were despatched to deal with them. A systematic program of destruction was commenced. The village of SAN LORENZO in STRADA (904913) was almost completely reduced to rubble.

38. From the continuous artillery intelligence data collated at my headquarters, as described in para 24., a heavy harassing program was maintained throughout this phase. A few different types of fire were also employed:-

(a) The dummy fire plan, ten minutes in length on targets chosen by ourselves, but with a co-ordinated timing throughout the two Corps front.

(b) The map square type of HF, consisting of one round on selected targets, in all map squares possible, every seven minutes.

Included also as HF might be the Counter Battery programmes which were continuous throughout this period and of which more detailed account will be provided by RCA 1 Cdn Corps.

39. The enemy, during this phase, produced his most effective Counter Battery weapon - lurking night bombers. The gun areas were bombed and strafed on five different nights. Strong representations were submitted in order that our LAA Regt be permitted to fire on the occasions of their visits. Permission was finally granted but only when our own night fighters were not affording protection. On occasions when firing was permitted, from a point of view of destruction, the guns were of little value, but from a point of view of harassing fire they did force the enemy to approach from higher levels and bomb less accurately. Morally they were of the highest value both to the LAA gunner who was firing his guns, and to the field gunner who was being protected.

40. The division was now regrouped and poised to go on. The divisional artillery was bolstered by the addition of one regiment of Greek artillery and three field plus one LAA Regt from 2 New Zealand (NZ) Armd Div which came under command 1 Cdn Inf Div 11 September 1944. Regiments as necessary had been moved forward. We were ready to support the next phase.

Phase V

The Crossing of the R MARANO The Battles for SAN LORENZO and SAN FORTUNATO Features The Capture of RIMINI

41. The stage was set and now the final phase to capture RIMINI was about to commence.

42. On 12 September 1944 the two corps offensive was launched starting with 5 Brit Corps

on the left supported by our three regiments of NZ Arty. On 13 September all 1 Cdn Div Arty groups supported the attack of 5 Cdn Armd Div on the ridge north of CORIANO (8787) subsequent to clearing the town proper.

43. At 1430 hours 14 Sep, 3 Cdn Inf Bde, with 12 Royal Tank Regt, started the divisional advance up the left side of the divisional sector. On the right 3 Greek Mountain Bde continued the exertion of pressure along the coast in the direction of RIMINI Airfield, and RIMINI. The 3 Cdn Inf Bde attack was put in across the R MARANO against the feature SAN LORENZO (862918) - SAN MARTINO (861935). By 1600 hours on 15 September, all but the right edge of this feature was in our hands. In the meantime 1 Cdn Inf Bde, less one battalion placed under command 3 Cdn Inf Bde, had crossed the R MARANO behind 3 Cdn Inf Bde and were coming up on their right in a flanking movement to cut Highway 16 above the RIMINI Airfield (8893). The leading battalion of 1 Cdn Inf Bde was ordered to assist in the battle for SAN MARTINO. Opposition on this right sector had stiffened. 3 Greek Mountain Bde in the meantime had started to advance and by the evening of 15 September the R MARANO had been cleared. Their advance then continued to the area immediately west of the airfield. 2 Cdn Inf Bde was brought forward then to assist in clearing this feature and thence to push through 3 Cdn Inf Bde bridgehead across R AUSA for the attack on the SAN FORTUNATO (8294) feature. This attack was carried out by both 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes and by afternoon of 20 September this feature was in our hands. The following two days, prior to the control of our sector passing to 2 NZ Div was spent in routine mopping up, and establishing a bridgehead across the R MARECCHIA.

44. The artillery support for this phase divided itself into stages to coincide with those of the infantry attacks:-

(a) Support, by a detailed fire plan, of the attack on the SAN LORENZO feature.

(b) A detailed fire plan on call for the 1 Cdn Inf Bde right hook.

(c) A fully planned and co-ordinated fire plan for the assault of the SAN FORTUNATO feature.



Night artillery shoot

(d) A smaller fire plan on call for the exploitation and crossing of the R MARECCHIA.

These were the anticipated requirements of the set piece fire plans for supporting the capture of RIMINI. However they do not include the numerous impromptu fire plans fired for battalions or bdes, and which were not previously anticipated.

45. The set piece fire plans utilized to the fullest the great weight of artillery in support of 1 Cdn Corps. A very high percentage of the 1301 rounds per gun expenditure of the divisional artillery for this period, was fired on these set piece programs. These plans, except in the case of (c) above, consisted of very carefully chosen concentrations and linear targets, so arranged in belts that portions could be stopped, paused, brought back or refired on call. It was always intended that the infantry be afforded the opportunity of being able to have the fire when they desired it and where they desired it. In this regard however very careful control was necessary at my headquarters. This control was maintained throughout and requests for fire were answered by the greatest weight of guns available in the shortest time possible.

46. The fire plan mentioned in para (c) above, differed however, in that it consisted of a series of linear targets in lanes, with one lane supporting each attacking battalion. These linear targets lifted in groups, as in a barrage, so that the infantry during their advance were able to control each lift as required, thus always maintaining a wall of fire in front of them. This fire plan was originally to have lasted two hours. Actually it was fired, stopped, brought back, paused and repeated during a period of almost six hours, as that was the time required for the infantry to secure their objectives.

47. Impromptu fire plans were far too numerous to record. They were fired to assist the infantry to start lines for set piece attacks. They were fired on outstanding points of resistance requiring added effort. They were fired once the objective had been attained and regrouping was necessary. These short term, short notice fire plans were a very important feature of the artillery support of this phase, and required at all times a detailed knowledge of the ever changing enemy situation. This was maintained as outlined previously.

48. Almost at all times, During the daylight throughout this period smoke was used to

screen the movement of our infantry and the infantry of our flanking formations. These were generally predicted smoke screens usually employing a regiment at a time. Observation and adjustment were carried out by the Air Observation Post and results were excellent. Both coloured smoke and smoke lines were fired by our artillery as bombing aids in the concerted bomber efforts throughout this phase. Smoke was recognized once again to be a definite and valuable form of artillery support.

49. Movement for this battle was confined to one move forward to facilitate support for the attacks on SAN FORTUNATO feature and one further move to facilitate support of the exploitation to the R MARECCHIA. Movement was not a problem but good gun areas were. The areas for all the regiments could at best be termed fair. Flash cover and protection for gun areas was not available and until the final feature was taken, it was almost impossible to escape observation by the enemy.

50. On 20 September NZ Arty passed from under command to in Support of 1 Cdn Inf Div. The PPCLI worked their way down to and over the R MARECCHIA. 3 Greek Mountain Bde entered and captured RIMINI. On 21 September the bridgehead was complete and 2 NZ Div commenced the take-over from 1 Cdn Inf Div. This was completed by the 22 September.

51. RIMINI had been taken and the operation was completed.

NOTE: Prevalent throughout this operation was an item which could not be isolated to any particular phase, the offensive utilization of anti-tank guns. 6-pounders, 17-pounders and M-10s were all used extensively in this role. They were brought well forward to destroy houses and fortifications as well as enemy tanks. Most anti-tank guns fired more high explosive (HE) than armour-piercing (AP) ammunition. They greatly assisted as close support weapons, the infantry or tanks whom they were supporting. No doubt

similar occasions will arise in the future when once again their role will be offensive rather than defensive.



Staff from 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade plan operations in Italy.