

# The Canadian Armed Forces Advisory and Training Team Tanzania 1965-1970

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At the beginning of the 1960s Canada embarked on an increasingly interventionist policy in Southern Africa that included a significant number of peacekeeping, military, and technical assistance programmes<sup>1</sup>. In addition to peacekeeping efforts in the Congo (1960-64), Canada provided military assistance to Ghana (1961-68), Zambia (1965), Tanzania (1965-70) and Nigeria (1963/1968-70). While the Zambia and Nigeria missions were essentially responses to emergencies, the Ghana and Tanzania missions were more calculated affairs. To help foster democratic governments Canada agreed to assist in the establishment and training of professional armies and air forces which, when combined with governmental assistance and other infrastructure building, would firmly support a pro-Western rather than communist regime in the two countries. While the mission for Ghana began in 1961, the Canadian Armed Forces Advisory and Training Team Tanzania (CAFATTT) was officially authorized on December 8th, 1964, after Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson made the announcement in the House of Commons. Over the next five years the Canadian contingent built the Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) from the ground up, creating everything from Tanzania's National Defence Act to the instructional pamphlets used for teaching weapons classes. Throughout the CAFATTT mission both Russian and Chinese advisory teams who were also competing for Tanzania continuously challenged the Canadians, initiating a game of Cold War chess with all of Southern Africa as the prize. In the end, the Canadians were unable to sway

Tanzania towards the west and were forced to leave only five years after they had first arrived.

## The Formation of Tanzania 1946-1964

Following the end of the Second World War Great Britain reluctantly agreed to place a number of its African protectorates under United Nations (UN) trusteeship. In Tanganyika the British government began a slow transition by encouraging Africans to enter the civil service while higher educated Africans were positioned to eventually take over various aspects of the administration. The move was designed to retain a substantial voice for white Europeans and Asians in colonial politics while Tanganyikian Africans were confined to the development of local infrastructure. The British government continued to control Tanganyikian markets and in particular its sisal production over which Britain had exclusive buying rights. Britain was also the sole purchaser of Tanganyikian coffee at a fixed price though this agreement ended in 1952. Overall, while publicly Britain had agreed to encourage self-rule it had in fact taken very few steps in that direction.

In July 1954 the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was created under the leadership of a well-educated political activist named Julius K. Nyerere. TANU immediately notified the Colonial Office and the British authorities that its ultimate aim was independence for Tanganyika. The governor, Sir Edward Twining, tried to restrict its activities and prohibit the

printing and publishing of material or any assembly that was likely to raise discontent amongst the inhabitants of the country. Despite these efforts, by 1956 the party had registered over 100,000 members. The following year the government banned TANU in ten districts, but its membership still continued to grow. By 1960, TANU was firmly rooted in Tanganyika and had gained enough influence to create the political momentum needed to move towards an African-led independence. The Tanganyika election of August 30th, 1960, was a resounding success for TANU. Running unopposed in 58 of Tanganyika's 71 seats, the party lost only one of the remaining thirteen ballots. Following the election Governor Turnbull appointed Julius Nyerere as Chief Minister of the Council of Ministers, the first African to ever hold the position.

In March 1961 a series of talks between Nyerere and the British Colonial Secretary, Iain MacLeod, led to the announcement that full internal self-government in Tanganyika would begin on 15 May 1961. Though Nyerere was appointed Prime Minister of Tanganyika on this date, the British Governor retained control of foreign affairs and the military until Tanganyika's full independence on 9 December 1961.

While Tanganyika marched towards its independence so did its offshore neighbours, Zanzibar and Pemba. Socioeconomic and ethnic divisions on the two islands had led to an increase in violence beginning in the 1950s. Arabs, Indians, Africans, and white Europeans all struggled for control in an endless series of bloody clashes. In 1954, a number of political groups emerged including the Arab Association, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP), and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP). Each party had a similar platform differing only in terms of who would actually rule the islands.

In a general election held in January 1961, the ZNP and ZPPP won equal victories and formed a coalition government that included a small number of members from the ASP. Wanting to ensure its own survival the ZNP sent party members out into the countryside to take over rural administrations while the mainlander police force, Zanzibar's most experienced and competent authority, was dismissed and

replaced with ZNP constables. Finally, the government announced the prohibition of all other political parties, giving itself dictatorial rule over the islands.

Like Tanganyika, Zanzibar was also released from Colonial rule and became an independent state on 10 December 1963. The ZNP/ZPPP continued to hold power with a majority of the seats, however the ASP had in fact received the majority (54.3%) of the popular vote in the last election. Within a few weeks the newly independent state fell into chaos, and a bloody revolution in January 1964 did away with the coalition government and the Sultanate. Immediately following the revolt the Umma Party, a radical element of the ZNP led by Abdul Rahman Mohammed-Babu, and the more radical elements of the ASP took political control and steered the island towards a union with Tanganyika. Zanzibar and Pemba joined Tanganyika on 26 April 1964, and the three territories formed the United Republic of Tanzania.

### **Canada and Military Assistance to Tanzania**

After the end of the Second World War military assistance emerged as an important instrument of international diplomacy employed by both the East and the West<sup>2</sup>. Canadian participation in military assistance programs began in the late 1950s as officials in the Department of External Affairs (DEA) realized the increasing value of such aid in contributing to towards the pro-democratic evolution of the developing world. While not overly anxious to divert scarce resources away from Europe, the decolonization and expansion of the New British Commonwealth provided yet another opportunity for Canada to participate in post-war international affairs<sup>3</sup>.

The rapid disintegration of European rule in Central and Southern Africa instantly created a power vacuum that neither the Soviet Union or the United States was prepared to accept. For Canadian officials who naively hoped that Africa might not become another East-West battleground there was an argument made towards cabinet that military assistance would bring both internal and international stability



Captain John P. Saunders, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, assigned to the Canadian Military Training Team in Dar es Salaam, instructs Tanzanian soldiers on the 82 mm mortar, 11 March 1967.

to the region. More realistically, it was well accepted by both Washington and Ottawa that if the West refused to help new African nations, they might feel it necessary to turn toward the Communist bloc for assistance.<sup>4</sup>

In June 1961 Cabinet approved the conditions under which the Department of National Defence (DND) would accept as part of its commitments the flexibility to train as required military personnel of Commonwealth countries.<sup>5</sup> Almost immediately DND responded to requests for assistance from Nigeria and Ghana, and had sent a full training team to the latter country by the end of the year.

Unlike Nigeria and Ghana, the first request made by Tanganyika (later Tanzania) for Canadian military assistance met with little success. Forwarded to DND in April 1963, the inquiry was quickly turned down by the newly appointed Minister of National Defence (MND), Paul Hellyer. The MND had just initiated a complete reorganization of DND and refused to undertake any further commitments until the

job was done.<sup>6</sup> Hellyer's stubbornness proved particularly frustrating for the Department of External Affairs as Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson had verbally committed Canada to assisting Tanganyika during President Julius Nyerere's visit to Ottawa in July 1963. Heated debate between DEA, DND, Finance, and the Department of Defence Production (DDP) eventually led to a feasible solution whereby all parties participated in an interdepartmental Military Assistance Committee (MAC) that would share control over budgets and programs. The MAC determined how requests for aid would be fulfilled and then forwarded proposals and budget costs to the Cabinet Committee on External Affairs and Defence (CCEAD) for approval. With a satisfactory mechanism in place DEA was able to renew their efforts to procure military assistance for Tanzania.<sup>7</sup>

In August 1964 a request for a military survey team to Tanzania was approved by the CCEAD and upon receipt of the team's report after their return in December, a general program for Canadian military assistance was



Tanzanian soldiers are taught how to use a generator tester by RCEME Sergeant John Rogers, 11 March 1967.

## The Deployment of CAFATTT

With the decision finalized, DND tasked the Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) to provide the advisory group and a training group for CAFATTT. The advisory group assignment was a two-year accompanied posting at the Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) headquarters in Dar es Salaam, while the training group assignment was a one-year unaccompanied posting at Colito Barracks just outside of the Tanzanian capital (see map). CFHQ selected Colonel H.E.C. Price, Canadian Guards, to lead the first thirty man team to Tanzania, with Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Gardner of the Fort Garry Horse as his senior training advisor." An advance party consisting of Colonel Price, Major A.M. Potts, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), and Sergeant P.L. Magalos, Headquarters (HQ) Western Command, arrived in Dar es Salaam in January 1965 to establish contact with the TPDF and prepare for the arrival of the rest of the team.

accepted.<sup>8</sup> Speaking later in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Lester Pearson stated:

It is a source of great personal satisfaction to me that suitable means have been found for Canada to co-operate with the United Republic of Tanzania in the development of the defence and internal security forces of that important member of the Commonwealth. We respect the desire of the Tanzanian government to follow a policy of non-alignment, and the programme which has been agreed [to] in principle between our two governments is in no way intended to interfere with that policy.<sup>9</sup>

The details of the MAC plan for Tanzania were straightforward. Canada was to deploy a team of approximately 30 advisory and training personnel to Tanzania to assist in the development of the defence and security forces, and make places available for Tanzanians in Canadian military establishments and courses. In addition, the Canadian government agreed in principle to assume the foreign exchange costs of building a military training center in Tanzania.<sup>10</sup> While the first two tasks were relatively easy to execute, the mission to build the Tanzania Military Academy (TMA) proved much more politically and financially difficult for Canada to complete.

At first the task must have appeared impossible. The TPDF was in a decrepit state, disorganized, scattered, and rife with corruption especially within its officer corps. The order of battle boasted only two under strength infantry battalions and a small headquarters at Dar es Salaam, a total of 53 officers and 2,000 men, of whom a thousand were recruits. In 1964, the army had mutinied over issues of service and pay, and the Tanzanian government embarrassingly required the aid of British forces to put down the revolt and restore order. In the end the TPDF were granted many of their demands and the force was reorganized, though this allowed only some veteran soldiers to benefit while the majority of the army was left to ruin.

The advisory group worked with Brigadier General M. S. H. Sarakikya, the Tanzanian Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) to establish the foundations of what would become a new military, while the training group prepared Colito Barracks to serve as the temporary military academy until the permanent academy was completed at Arusha. Colonel Price quickly discovered that there was much work to be done. The TPDF had no National Defence Act (NDA), no military legal or logistics system, and no

administrative capability. There were no service records for soldiers nor any system to regulate and verify pay. Not a single qualified or experienced staff officer could be found in the Defence Force Headquarters (DFHQ), and there was not even a clerical staff to handle typing and filing. Everything had to be built up from scratch.

The training group experienced similar challenges. The TPDF had no recognized training standards or system, and there were no training aids or instructional pamphlets for any of the trades. The TPDF employed a variety of weapons and equipment from half a dozen western and eastern bloc countries, though the majority of material was of Chinese origin. Without any existing personnel administrative system at DFHQ, it was impossible to determine who had been trained to what level.

The Tanzania Military Academy was initially organized into five wings with a staff of 250 personnel, including 18 Canadians. Each wing - administrative, basic training, officer training, battalion training, and technical training - was overseen by two Canadian members assisted by a small number of recently trained Tanzanian officers and soldiers. The objective was to provide direction while TPDF instructors were trained after which the Canadian positions could gradually be eliminated. From May to December 1965, 21 courses were conducted in five professional advancement fields and six trades, resulting in 232 graduates by the end of the first year of operation. Triple the numbers of students was expected the following year.<sup>12</sup>

Because of the tropical climate the TMA began operations daily at 0730 hours, breaking for lunch at 1200 hours and ending classes at 1500 hours. During the cooler seasons this left a few hours for physical training before supper, but during the Tanzania summer few ventured outside for physical activity before 1630 hours. After hours the students and staff found recreation in squash, golf, sailing, and deep-sea fishing, as well as messes for both the officers and men at Colito Barracks.<sup>13</sup> The CAFATTT personnel were garrisoned either at the officer's mess or in furnished housing in Dar es Salaam until more permanent quarters were constructed.

## Add the Air Force

A number of countries had responded to Tanzanian requests for military and technical assistance, including West Germany, which had taken on the task of developing the country's air force.<sup>14</sup> In 1964, the West German government protested Julius Nyerere's decision to allow an East German consulate in Dar es Salaam and threatened to terminate their military and technical aid. Declaring that no country would decide Tanzania's friends and enemies, Nyerere directed the West Germans to remove all of their advisors from the country and cancel not only their military and technical assistance but also their economic aid as well. While politically impressive the decision was not particularly astute, and the sudden cessation of West German assistance left Tanzania's air force in a precarious state. As Canada had just recently committed itself to training the Tanzanian army, Nyerere explored the possibility of Ottawa assisting with the development of its airforce as well. On 6 April 1965, Ottawa announced that it had agreed in principle to meet a further Tanzanian request for military support, this time in the establishment of a military air wing.

Canada dispatched an air survey team consisting of two officers, Group Captain (G/C) G.H. Currie, and Squadron Leader (S/L) H.L. McCormick, and one administrative clerk, Sergeant J. R. Boutin to Tanzania, while a number of Tanzanian air wing personnel traveled to Canada to begin their training. Upon his return to Ottawa, G/C Currie reported that Tanzania required considerable equipment and training assistance in order to achieve a modest air-transport and liaison capability within the next five years. From the field report the MAC formulated a detailed assistance proposal that was readily accepted by Tanzania. Ottawa publicly announced on 3 September 1965, that Canada would donate up to four Caribou and eight Otter aircraft and assist with the training of up to 400 Tanzanian aircrew, ground crew, and support personnel. Half of these would be trained in Canada while the other half would be trained in Tanzania.<sup>15</sup>

Like the army, the Tanzanian air wing had to be built up from nothing. The study conducted by the CAFATTT air wing in October 1965

confirmed that Tanzania lacked any sort of air control system, ground control facilities, supply system, or stock control. Pilots needed conversion training on both the Caribou and Otter aircraft, and technicians had to be taught how to service them. Based on this situation G/C Currie and his advisory staff produced a notional air wing establishment for Tanzania, a five-year development plan, and a budget. The CAFATTT air wing also recruited more Tanzanian personnel to come to Canada to join the five Tanzanian officers who had already reported for flying and technical instruction in June 1965.<sup>16</sup>

In January 1966 the first sixteen RCAF personnel arrived at Dar es Salaam under the command of S/L I. K. MacKenzie to establish air operations and training facilities. The first priorities were the initiation of conversion training for pilots and ground crew and the building of the facilities required for a self-supporting air wing. The construction at the airfield proceeded slowly until the Britoria oil lift to Zambia ceased operations at the end of May 1966, thus eliminating the congestion in the air wing operations area. The first two donated Caribou aircraft sporting Tanzanian markings arrived from Nairobi on May 19th, 1966, flown in on the last leg by newly trained Tanzanian pilots. After a perfect landing the two aircraft were handed over in a well-publicized ceremony to officially mark the creation of Tanzania's airforce.<sup>17</sup>

### **The Naval Dilemma**

With the development of Tanzania's air and ground forces well under way, Julius Nyerere next turned his attention towards building a navy. Not wanting to give the Communists any chance to exploit a newly opened door, the United States quietly but quickly requested that Canada instruct CAFATTT to deter the Tanzanians from building a naval force at all. Colonel Price had already made this recommendation to Brigadier Sarakikya, arguing that manning a navy would drain scarce human resources from the army and air wing. However when the Tanzanian President persisted in advancing the issue, Brigadier Sarakikya was left with little choice but to address the matter seriously. The naval dilemma that followed became the first of a

series of Cold War chess matches played out by CAFATTT during its tenure in Southern Africa.

An initial suggestion that the British train the Tanzanian navy was promptly refused by President Julius Nyerere, who was at the time officially opposing British economic sanctions against the recently self-independent Rhodesia that had in turn begun to cripple other south African economies as well.<sup>18</sup> However, a British naval officer had already been tasked to complete an assessment for Tanzania's naval requirements in early 1966, and his report became the basis for subsequent offers of western assistance.<sup>19</sup> The officer had estimated that the initial requirement for a coastal maritime patrol force was 240 officers and men manning three patrol craft. With the necessary shore installations the cost was estimated at £3,150,000 plus £289,200 annually for operations and maintenance. Realizing that given the political situation surrounding Rhodesia it seemed unlikely that Britain would spearhead the effort, other western European nations were canvassed for support. Of the few who agreed to consider the idea, only the Netherlands gave the proposal any serious consideration, but they soon declined as well.<sup>20</sup>

A confidential message to Ottawa on 14 June 1966, informed External Affairs that within twenty-four hours of the Dutch refusal the Chinese ambassador in the Hague had called on the Tanzanian ambassador, Mr. Ngaiza, and informed him that China would be pleased to train the Tanzanians and meet all costs including the supplement of naval vessels.<sup>21</sup>

The door had suddenly swung wide open for Chinese competition. Within four days the State Department of the United States responded by attempting to persuade the Dutch government to reverse its decision, and had sent a secret message to Ottawa asking for Canadian support in their efforts. The Americans were clearly concerned about increased Chinese activity in the western Indian Ocean, especially so near the U.S. meteorological and research installation at Aldabra. Additionally, Chinese naval assistance to Tanzania could have led to the justification for the establishment of shore facilities and communications installations, and the sudden increased presence of two hundred plus Chinese military advisors would almost certainly have



## Tanzania - Tanganyika and Zanzibar

jeopardized the western position in the Indian Ocean area.<sup>22</sup>

Despite further efforts by Washington to encourage the Dutch to change their position, by September 1966 the issue was closed. The decision left the American State Department with only Canada as an immediate influence against Tanzania seeking aid from a Communist country: there was good reason to suspect that the Soviets had done the same. Tanzania had been improving its relationship with China since its independence and clearly Washington perceived this as a strategic threat. President Nyerere eventually decided to postpone acting

on the Chinese naval offer, and Colonel Price suspected that perhaps he was waiting to see if the Soviet Union would step forward with a better offer still.<sup>23</sup> There was no doubt in his mind that the outcome would be of great interest to Washington.

### Developing Command and Control of the TPDF

Despite reform in the TPDF there continued a serious deficiency in command and control of the army. Few, if any, of the TPDF senior leadership had any real command

experience, and staff abilities were entirely absent from both the headquarters and the army. Realizing this to be the lynchpin in the development of the army, Colonel Price with the support of Brigadier Sarakikya initiated the TPDF senior officers study group that became an annual event. Attended by senior officers from the three TPDF infantry battalions plus a few representing the headquarters and the air wing, the first week long work shop in 1966 was designed to brief the senior leadership on the progress of the TPDF development, to discuss future plans for organization, training, and operations, and to study the principles of tactical employment in preparation for the annual collective training period at Monduli in the autumn. Well attended, the only disappointment was that the two officers invited from Zanzibar failed to arrive at the workshop, and no explanation for their absence was provided. However it became increasingly obvious to the Canadians that a gap was forming between the mainland force and those stationed on Zanzibar, where Communist advisors had taken the lead.<sup>24</sup>

The short training session highlighted the obvious weaknesses in the TPDF command. Map reading and battle procedure skills amongst the TPDF officers were very poor, and they demonstrated considerable difficulties in solving tactical problems above the platoon level.<sup>25</sup> This was understandable to Col. Price and his advisors, as many of the older poorly qualified officers were commissioned after the 1964 mutiny and the newer Canadian trained TPDF officers had never deployed more than a handful of soldiers in any operation. Meanwhile, those that had been sent for officer training in Eastern Bloc or Asian countries had demonstrated no skills. The problem lay in the obvious differences in training that each group had received. While those Tanzanians sent to Canada for officer training were simply incorporated into existing regular officer candidate training courses, those sent to Russia, the United Arab Republic (UAR), and Indonesia had received special courses designed for foreign nationals. Upon returning from Russia and the UAR the TPDF officers turned in course reports showing that they had

The Tanzanian People's Defence Force received weapons from many sources, though the training was often lacking. In many cases the Canadian instructors had to teach themselves how to use the weapons before instructing their Tanzanian students. Here, Sergeant Robert Smith relates the finer points of using a Communist-bloc 12.7 mm heavy machine gun.



qualified as battalion commanders, while those returning from Indonesia were graciously qualified as 'generals'. The CAFATTT commander suggested running all returning officers through a junior officer refresher course in July 1966 before deployment to Monduli, and Brigadier Sarakikya agreed. Of those attending, almost all of the Eastern Bloc trained officers failed and had to be re-taught over the summer by CAFATTT instructors.<sup>26</sup>

### **Field Training at Monduli**

In the autumn of 1966 three battalions of the TPDF infantry traveled to Monduli for their first full-scale field exercise. Up to this point none of the units had ever operated a field command post, and very few of the troops had ever fired their weapons or lived in the field for a protracted period. The aim of the exercise was to evaluate the individual training that the TPDF had received to date, and to see whether they could operate up to the battalion level. Under the watchful eye of their Canadian advisors, Tanzanian soldiers were evaluated on the operation of a battalion headquarters, on the conduct of offensive, defensive, and internal security operations, and on the use of support weapons in support of battalion sub-units.<sup>27</sup>

Beginning with the 3rd Battalion TPDF on September 3rd, 1966, each unit was evaluated by Lieutenant Colonel S. F. Andrunyk, the CAFATTT senior training advisor.<sup>28</sup> During the first week each battalion conducted basic routine and individual skills training to get prepared for more complex operations. During the second week LCol. Andrunyk conducted a Tactical Exercise(s) Without Troops (TEWT) with the officers, while Major K. L. Mollison and Major J. W. Cummings supervised a controlled company level exercise (EX TAYARISHA).<sup>29</sup> LCol. Andrunyk also tested the TPDF officers on their battle procedure and fire planning, while Majors Mollison and Cummings ran the TPDF companies through a series of defensive positions and ambush drills. Additionally, the soldiers practiced firing their 82mm mortars with a limited degree of skill and success. During the final week of training the CAFATTT officers conducted EX NGUVU MOJA, a three-day battalion sized cordon and sweep of a guerilla infested area. While conducting the operation the

TPDF battalion was "attacked" and had to mount an effective counter-attack against the CAFATTT enemy force.

The field exercise highlighted a number of areas where further training was still needed. Overall, the command and control of the battalion was weak as none of the officers had any experience in operating a tactical HQ. The headquarters was seriously lacking in support staff and few of the officers had staff training of any sort. The battalion intelligence sections were not trained at all prior to their arrival at Monduli, and the Intelligence Officers (IO) were more concerned with security matters in their home stations than with operational intelligence. This was understandable considering that in the past home station security had been their primary function. The CAFATTT advisor recommended that in the future the battalion should create a field security section for operations and leave the remaining intelligence staff at home.<sup>30</sup>

Personal shortcomings and frustrations with command were further aggravated by the criticisms of Lieutenant Colonel Ali Mafude, second in command of TPDF forces in Zanzibar, who had accompanied several Zanzibar officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to observe the field training at Monduli. Lieutenant Colonel Mafude had received his military and political training at the hands of Soviet and Chinese advisors, who had obviously encouraged him to speak out against any system or tactics that the Canadians had introduced to the TPDF. The presence of Mafude and his entourage had become so annoying during the first week of training that the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion TPDF, Lieutenant Colonel Musuguri, made a formal request to Lieutenant Colonel Andrunyk that they be removed from the camp, and by force if necessary. Andrunyk immediately contacted the Chief of the Defence Staff on the matter, and within a few hours Brigadier Sarakikya had arrived and collected the group. Mafude and his fellow officers were immediately returned to Zanzibar town on Sarakikya's return flight, leaving the CAFATTT team to carry on with training uninterrupted.<sup>31</sup>

The field training at Monduli in 1966 revealed that all ranks of the TPDF suffered a number of difficulties. There was in general a poor knowledge of support weapons and the

TPDF soldiers had not been taught indirect fire methods. This came as something of a surprise to the CAFATTT instructors as the Chinese advisors had supposedly trained the TPDF on all support weapons that their country had provided. Noting that there were no teaching aids for the Chinese weapons, a couple of the Canadian NCOs taught themselves how to employ both the 82mm mortar and the 7.62 Medium Machine Guns effectively, and then wrote training guides that were later used to teach TPDF soldiers. Another surprising weakness was driving skills, in particular cross-country driving. Again the Canadian soldiers learned to master the Chinese vehicles before passing a number of TPDF soldiers through a make-shift driver's course.

In general TPDF battle skills were also weak. Protection on the battlefield was poor and units were reluctant to employ reconnaissance forces and fighting patrols. In some cases, Canadian advisors noted that TPDF standing patrols were positioned too close to the main defensive position yet without communications to warn of an impending attack.<sup>32</sup> It was realized that these traits were typical of a force used to dealing more with internal security and not sovereignty defence. However, the TPDF troops performed well during the cordon and sweep exercise, a maneuver they had had more experience in executing. Overall, Lieutenant Colonel Andrunyk was satisfied that many lessons had been learned at Monduli and that the capability of the TPDF army was slowly improving.

## Enter the Dragon

In mid 1966 the Chinese began to augment their physical presence in Tanzania and openly challenged Canadian dominance in the country's military and technical assistance programs. In July Colonel Price reported to Ottawa that coincident with the preparation of the 1966-67 Tanzania defence budget was the recommendation that the TPDF acquire both tanks and artillery. It was argued by the Tanzanian Second Vice-President that both were required for suppressing potential riots or other possible trouble in the capital of Dar es Salaam, and that the Chinese had graciously offered to supply tanks, artillery, and training for Tanzanian crews. It was difficult for Colonel Price

to justify the tabling of the issue for the time being, but he managed to do so. On August 15th, DND received another confidential memorandum from Department of External Affairs via Washington stating that 12 large truck tankers and a quantity of unidentified heavy equipment had been delivered to the Island of Zanzibar by the Chinese navy. Furthermore the message noted that four Cubans had also arrived on the island via the Chinese, possibly to train local revolutionaries for fighting in Mozambique.<sup>33</sup> While such activity did not yet threaten Canada's presence in Tanzania it certainly undermined the omnipotence that CAFATTT had enjoyed thus far.

The Chinese increased their influence in other ways as well. The increasing number of Chinese weapons being incorporated into the TPDF led the CAFATTT commander to advise the CDF that in the interests of standardization, other types of weapons should be withdrawn in favour of Chinese equipment, of which there was sufficient amount to equip the infantry battalions and the TMA. Brigadier Sarakikya agreed in principle, however he reminded Colonel Price that the plan was not politically acceptable as the Soviets might be offended if the weapons they provided were discarded. One could not dismiss the irony of the CAFATTT commander promoting the position of his main adversary, however for the moment the issue also went unresolved.<sup>34</sup> What was certain was that a dichotomy of effort was evolving in the TPDF development plan with CAFATTT on one side and the Chinese on the other.

To service their weapons the Chinese advisors established a small arms repair workshop at Colito Barracks that employed fourteen People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers. The group avoided any contact with the Canadians, and when the two did meet there were no exchanges of pleasantries. Despite whatever official mutual good will was enforced upon the two groups by Julius Nyerere both parties knew the true reasons for each other's presence in Tanzania, and both intended to win.<sup>35</sup>

A number of Russian and Chinese vehicles had also been donated to the TPDF, yet unlike their weapons the vehicles were seldom serviceable. Twenty-five BTR-60 Armoured

Sergeant Robert Craig, PPCLI, trains soldiers from the TPDF on the 75 mm recoilless rifle.

Personnel Carriers (APC) delivered by the Soviet Union in March and October 1965 had hardly left the compound where they were unloaded due to a lack of spare parts. Another 55 Chinese Jay Fong trucks delivered suffered a similar fate, with over half of them unserviceable upon delivery. However, despite these issues the point was being made. China had delivered in excess of \$2 million in assets including material for home station development at both Nachingwea and Zanzibar. Chinese advisors were deploying with the materials to oversee the work and continue their efforts in promoting an anti-western government and defence force. By contrast, western interests had delivered limited assistance and more often than not had tried to dissuade Tanzania from acquiring advanced weapon systems. This diplomatic approach had had an adverse effect on western influence in the region.<sup>36</sup>

In December 1966 Colonel Price was informed by Brigadier Sarakikya that despite his own arguments to the Tanzanian government the decision had been made by the Second Vice-President to dispatch ten officers and sixty men to China for training on the tanks that the Communists intended to supply.<sup>37</sup> Soon after the Chinese deployed a team of approximately eight persons to Songea to train reserve soldiers, and possibly a second group to train others at Musoma. Songea had been chosen as the home station of the planned 6th Battalion TPDF, with the 7th Battalion TPDF planned for Musoma. The latter station was located not far from the Kiabakari Gold Mine, then considered one of the country's strategic assets.<sup>38</sup>

CAFATTT officers found TPDF defence planning increasingly difficult as Chinese intervention expanded through 1966 and 1967. Despite regular meetings with Brigadier Sarakikya and Mr. Kyesi, the Principle Assistant Secretary for the Ministry of Defence, there seemed to be no way to achieve a realistic defence plan or budget. Worse, there was no coordination between the Tanzanian Ministry of Defence and its Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning. The existing defence plan had called for £7-10 million a year while the Treasury had allotted only £3-5 million. The



sudden desire to include the formation of a navy and an armoured unit further degraded the viability of the defence plan, and the Canadians argued that there was little hope of establishing a credible force if the Tanzanian government continued.<sup>39</sup> Colonel Price put forth that priority for a capability had to be based on need, availability of outside assistance, and capability to recruit, train, equip, house, maintain that capability. He also argued that neither the international situation nor the national security situation at that time warranted any sort of accelerated build up of force. Finally, the CAFATTT chief engineer warned that the terrain simply did not favour tanks, as most roads in Tanzania were metalled and the bridges were not designed to sustain anything over twenty-two tonnes.<sup>40</sup> In end despite all of the advice CAFATTT offered, there seemed to be no way to deter the government from accepting certain Chinese plans over their own.

### The Enemies Within

**T**he continuously evolving security situation in Tanzania had serious effects on the ability of CAFATTT to continue with its planned operations throughout the next two years. A

number of issues arose both in the international arena as well as at home regarding the nature of the training the Canadians were providing and the extent to which they had become involved in the internal and external security matters of Tanzania. Far from simply fostering good international relations and contributing to peace and stability, the CAFATTT found itself increasingly embroiled in the complicated game of Cold War chess being played out in Tanzania between themselves and the communists.

In December 1966 CAFATTT assisted in the coordination of a number of internal security operations throughout Tanzania's southern districts. In one instance the members of CAFATTT supervised an airlift of twenty field force policemen from Moshi to Lake Manyara to intercept a raid being carried out by the Wamang'ati tribe against the Masai tribe in retaliation for cattle theft.<sup>41</sup> Later the same month, CAFATTT assisted in the deployment of TPDF units to villages along the Tanzania-Mozambique border in response to the discovery of recently laid mines in the Mtwara district that had killed and wounded several civilians.<sup>42</sup> Additionally, CAFATTT recommended the immediate building up to strength of the 3rd Bn TPDF at Nachingwea because of its proximity to the Mozambique border and the possibility that there might be further incidents. The CDF agreed and further augmented the 3rd Bn TPDF with a company from the 4th Bn TPDF then stationed on Pemba.<sup>43</sup>

New evidence suggesting that soldiers were being trained in Tanzania for fighting in Mozambique and Rhodesia was one explanation for the increased attacks occurring along its southern border. CAFATTT had suspected that the Chinese advisors were training both civilians and TPDF reserve soldiers for guerilla warfare, though there was no clear evidence to suggest that TPDF regulars were being used for raids on Mozambique. Questions were raised in Ottawa by the Standing Committee on External Affairs (SCEA) in July 1967 regarding this matter, however the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs reassured the committee that CAFATTT had played no role in training raiders or freedom fighters. This point was reinforced during Second Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa's visit to Ottawa on July 19th, 1967, when he

categorically denied that freedom fighters were being trained by the TPDF or by CAFATTT.<sup>44</sup>

Despite such reassurances there was clearly evidence to suggest that soldiers belonging to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) were based in and operating from Tanzania. While the government declared they were not training and supporting FRELIMO units, they also stated that Tanzania made no sanction against FRELIMO equipment and supplies entering their ports or passing through their country. More interestingly, the most obvious clue to suggest Tanzanian collaboration could be found right at DFHQ in Dar es Salaam. Captain A. C. Diallo, a liaison officer from FRELIMO, had an office at DFHQ and was designated as a staff officer (supply) on the DFQH organization chart. His main responsibilities included the management of supplies entering Tanzania and destined for FRELIMO bases, and he often accompanied Mr. Mgonja, the Tanzanian Minister for State for Foreign Affairs, to sessions of the Coordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa. When approached on the issue, Brigadier Sarakikya stated that the TPDF was represented at such committees simply to be completely familiar with FRELIMO's plans and to ensure that there is no threat to Tanzanian security. Arguably there was a more important desire to retain control of the various organizations operating out of Tanzania's borders, as any action by these groups could invite an armed response by Mozambique, Rhodesia, and even South Africa.<sup>45</sup>

In returning accusations of collaboration, a unknown source distributed pamphlets to Tanzanian officer cadets training in Canada in March 1968 suggesting that South African agents were posing as instructors on both their courses and the CAFATTT to gather intelligence and monitor FRELIMO activities. Though the accusation was unfounded, it certainly wounded the reputation of the Canadians in Tanzania who had up to that point escaped any serious political scrutiny from their hosts.<sup>46</sup>

More disturbing incidents occurred towards the end of the year. In November 1967 the anti-tank section and machinegun section from the 3rd TPDF Bn at Nachingwea were dispatched to Mbamba Bay on Lake Nyasa in response to an

incident along the southern border. A month later a report arrived on the CAFATTT commander's desk at DFHQ suggesting that these units may have assisted FRELIMO in sinking two small Portuguese gunboats off Cobue, over a hundred kilometers south of Mbamba Bay on Lake Nyasa and well inside Mozambique territory.<sup>47</sup> Such incidents did much to destabilize the region and invited armed retaliation from both Rhodesia and Mozambique. South Africa also declared that it would come to the assistance of either country in the event of an attack. Portuguese and Rhodesian aircraft frequently flew into Tanzanian airspace to drop political leaflets and occasionally to engage suspected FRELIMO targets. In response, Tanzania considered its options for air defence and a more offensive air power capability beyond the turbo-prop transport aircraft that Canada had supplied.

### **The MIG Issue**

In response to the growing concern of retaliatory air and ground attacks against Tanzania by its neighbouring countries, President Nyerere dispatched a team of senior staff to Moscow in May 1968 to explore the possibility of acquiring MIG aircraft, radar field guns, and air defence systems.<sup>48</sup> Washington immediately responded to this action with a series of political and diplomatic manoeuvres, including a request to Ottawa to instruct CAFATTT to subtly discourage the TPDF from seeking fighter and missile acquisition at that time. Washington was extremely concerned about the possibility of either Tanzania or Zambia purchasing such hardware, indicating that a regional arms race might ensue and generally destabilise the region further.<sup>49</sup> More likely the Americans were concerned that the arrival of MIG fighters in Southern Africa would also invite increased Soviet influence in the region. Not only would such a deal require a large contingent of Soviet advisors and technical staff in Tanzania, thus radically tipping the scales in their favour, their generosity could potentially result in open airfields in Southern Africa for Soviet use in time of war.

Colonel Sheffield, who had replaced Colonel Price as commander of CAFATTT at the expiration of the latter's tour duty, approached

Brigadier Sarakikya on the issue of fighters under the guise of its potential impact on the existing Canadian training program. He managed to subtly advance American concerns without appearing overbearing and the CDF left Colonel Sheffield with the impression that he had taken the Canadian advice seriously.<sup>50</sup> However, it was clear that Tanzania's government intended to pursue the matter further, and once again Canada found itself in the middle of a game of Cold War chess.

The MIG issue remained complicated for all parties. There were a number of factors that weighed against the possibility of Tanzania acquiring MIG aircraft including the fact that Tanzanian-Soviet relations were generally poor. The Russians had had little success in the past in convincing Julius Nyerere to accept Soviet equipment and advisors, and the Soviet MIG fighter support to Nigeria in their war against the Biafrans had greatly disturbed Tanzania, which favoured the latter group in the conflict. As well, due to British influence in both the Zambian and Kenyan militaries they tended to advise Tanzania against pursuing Soviet assistance. Finally the sheer cost of maintaining sophisticated aircraft was simply beyond the current Tanzanian defence budget.<sup>51</sup>

By the end of May 1968 it appeared that the government had decided to pursue the possibility of acquiring both MIG fighters and an air defence system though no clear indication was given of how the Tanzanians planned to proceed. The CAFATTT dispatched valuable messages on the MIG issue to Ottawa on a daily basis, allowing the decision makers in Ottawa to keep Washington well informed of the situation on the ground while assessing Canada's own next moves. When it was realised that the TPDF would encounter serious difficulties in establishing a fighter air wing, Colonel Sheffield with the permission of Ottawa once again stepped forward to offer Canadian assistance on the matter. Every opportunity to retain influence over the TPDF was seized, and in this case Canada had the additional advantage of already having significant influence over Tanzania's air power development. Still, it was unknown if Canada could succeed in stifling the Russian offer as it had lost considerable influence with the TPDF over the last year while the Chinese had gained much political ground. By 1968

Chinese influence had certainly become a factor in every major defence decision now being taken by the Tanzanian government.

### **Ending the Program**

**B**y March 1968 the Department of National Defence had expended almost \$7.5 million in military assistance to Tanzania, spending well beyond its original proposed budget of \$4.54 million for the entire five-year program. Like all programs without a precedent the original budget was grossly underestimated, and did not account for unexpected equipment costs and the need for extra supplies and staff. The addition of the Air Wing in 1965 greatly added to the immediate costs of the mission, although approximately \$10.5 million had been set aside for its establishment and maintenance. A review of the costs for the program identified that there was little possibility of reducing current expenditures without significantly depleting the Canadian presence in the country, and there remained several tasks that had yet to be accomplished.<sup>52</sup> A particular point of contention with the Tanzanian government was the failure thus far on the part of Canada to complete the construction of the military academy. Although the site survey was completed in 1967 the building had yet to be constructed, mainly because the original training budget of \$700,000 annually had included the cost of the construction of the TMA and the CAFATTT was spending over \$1 million a year on training. It was then doubtful that by mid-1968 Cabinet would have approved additional funds for the army project and given that the program was scheduled to terminate in approximately two years it seemed unlikely that the TMA would ever be built.<sup>53</sup>

Moreover, by July 1968 the CAFATTT was clearly losing ground to the Communist competition. Second Vice-President Kawawa had invited a team of Soviet senior officers to Tanzania in June to advise on their air defence requirements and made no effort to inform Colonel Sheffield of their visit. Then in July Mr. Kawawa made a number of comments to the press regarding his general displeasure with Canadian assistance to date, detailing the lack of progress on the TMA and the failure to provide

Tanzania with a more sophisticated (fighter jet) air force. By contrast, the Soviets had offered a squadron of MIG-21s and three squadrons of MIG-15s, a gift that Canada simply could not match. Additionally, while the CDF had argued that CAFATTT's training standards far superseded those of the Chinese, Cubans, or Russians, it was becoming painfully obvious that Canada's connection to NATO and the west was taking its toll on their welcome in country.

In early October a 'gift' of 14 Chinese tanks arrived at Dar es Salaam signalling yet another move by the communists to gain favour in Tanzania. Stationed at Lugalo just outside the city, Colonel Sheffield had offered Canadian assistance in developing the unit but was politely refused by the CDF who told him that the Canadians were not invited to participate in the formation of the TPDF Tank Company. It was the first time that CAFATTT was not responsible for training a part of the army, and although they had access to the Tank Company commander at DFHQ, they were not allowed to visit the unit home station or facilities.<sup>54</sup> CAFATTT could only make a note to Ottawa that the TPDF was not expected to receive any operational tank training from Chinese advisors but simply maintenance and repair skills.<sup>55</sup>

In 1969 CAFATTT began preparations for the possible termination of its mandate in the following year. Canada was still uncertain whether they would be requested to extend the CAFATTT beyond 1970, though the general feeling in Ottawa was that it seemed very likely given the great deal of work to be done. Despite the growing presence of China and the recent animosity displayed by the Second Vice President, Mr. Kawawa, CAFATTT remained very influential in Tanzania's military affairs and both the CDF and the President still favoured CAFATTT's presence. However, early in the year the newly appointed minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mhando, delivered a message on behalf of Mr. Kawawa indicating that Tanzania was extremely satisfied with the assistance from Canada and that CAFATTT had been so successful that it could terminate on schedule in January 1970. Kawawa asked the air wing to remain and assist with the development of a separate military air force, but the CAFATTT army program was officially over.<sup>56</sup>

The message came as both a surprise and a relief. Ottawa was delighted to learn that Tanzania had chosen not to pursue the MIG option, however they were surprised to learn that the Army training program was to be terminated. Colonel Sheffield had continued to participate in TPDF defence planning throughout 1969 and it was obvious that the army would need at least another five years of external assistance before attaining any degree of self-sufficiency. It was expected that the TPDF would continue to receive external assistance solely from China. For all its efforts on the ground, Canada had lost the larger political game.<sup>57</sup>

It was later learned that the Tanzanians had given considerable thought to the decision to terminate Canada's army assistance. First, by far the majority of the TPDF weapons and equipment were of Chinese origin and it made little sense to employ Canadian instructors when the Chinese were willing to provide the same training. As well, China had clearly stated its opposition to CAFATTT's advisory role when it was supplying the majority of weapons, and wanted a greater influence in TPDF development if it was going to continue its role as provider. Tanzania felt confident that it could now manage the TPDF on its own without CAFATTT assistance and their departure would eliminate the weapons - advisory conflict. Second, there was an immediate need to integrate the Zanzibar and mainland elements of the TPDF and it was clear that Canada's presence at DFHQ and the TMA was hindering that integration. Again the majority of Zanzibar and Pemba's officer corps had been trained by eastern powers and it seemed easier to remove CAFATTT than to foster internal political animosity. Finally, the issue of the TMA itself had become a sore spot with the Tanzanian government for some time. The construction had still not started by 1969 and it became questionable if the project would ever be completed. Both the Ministry of Defence and with TPDF officials believed that Canada had never intended to build the facility at all, and unfortunately CAFATTT could offer little defence. The TMA had been a mission failure.<sup>58</sup>

In May 1969 a number of Chinese advisors arrived at Dar es Salaam to begin training TPDF units. Again Colonel Sheffield had not been informed of the arrival, though the CDF mentioned it to him after a photo had appeared

in the local press.<sup>59</sup> While their arrival was not a surprise, it clearly indicated the beginning of the end for CAFATTT. Over the next few months the Canadians extricated themselves from the various units and bases and prepared for their return to Canada. Meanwhile the Chinese focused on turning the TPDF into a more revolutionary army to fight the European presence in Southern Africa and there was little CAFATTT could do to stop it. By December 1969 CAFATTT had ceased operations and the last army advisors returned to Canada in January 1970. The air wing team followed soon after.

## Conclusion

Overall the Canadian mission to Tanzania had been a success. In a little more than five years the Canadian Armed Forces had turned a mutinied rabble into something resembling a professional army, had linked the mainland with its islands by air, and had formed the nucleus of a modern air force. The construction of the TMA had been a failure, yet CAFATTT had established a self-sustaining training program without any facilities and very limited support. Other than the TMA all objectives had been met. For DND the CAFATTT marked yet another remarkable achievement that defined the professionalism of the Canadian Armed Forces even while in the throes of reorganisation at home.

Last, although the Communists had clearly prevailed in the Cold War battle for influence, Canadian-Tanzanian relations were not harmed by the termination of CAFATTT. In fact, some in DEA observed the ending as a blessing in disguise. Both Department of External Affairs and DND realised that Canada's presence in Tanzania attracted suspicion from the east that saw them as spies for Washington. This accusation held some truth, for CAFATTT clearly collaborated with western interests on a number of strategic issues, and it would have been difficult to pursue a foreign policy of moderate middle power under such circumstances. As well, given the very likely possibility that Tanzania was going to continue its active though indirect support of liberation forces, CAFATTT's role as advisor to the TPDF may have created possible future political difficulties for Ottawa and maybe even serious embarrassment.

Canada was, after all, a member of both NATO and the Commonwealth.

Finally, CAFATTT serves an interesting reminder of what was once easily within the capabilities of DND. The operational atrophy that followed the unification of the forces in 1967 depleted any possibility of carrying out similarly independent missions for two decades. In 1996 Canada made an attempt to independently deploy a force to central southern Africa only to fail for a miserable lack of strategic intelligence, lift, and combat service support. The force that actually arrived in theatre was a mere shadow of the presence that DND had made in Africa three decades before, and Canada has yet to revive DND to the point where it could undertake such missions without serious difficulty. For the present, Canada remains on the periphery of capably supplying assistance to the developing world in Africa.

### Notes

1. For more on Canada's Southern African policy during the 1960-70 period see D. Anglin, "Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa," *International Journal*, Col. 15 (Autumn 1960), pp.305-321; R.O. Matthews, "Africa in Canadian Affairs," *International Journal*, Vol.26:1 (Winter 1970-71), pp.122-150; and G. Legge, *etal*"The Black Paper: An Alternative Policy for Canada Towards Southern Africa," *Behind the Headlines*, Vol.30 (September 1970).
2. G. Donaghy, "The Rise and Fall of Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World, 1952-1971," *Canadian Military History*, Vol.4:1 (Spring 1995), p.75.
3. *Ibid*, pp.75-78.
4. Department of External Affairs [DEA]. File 11384-40. N. A. Robertson. "Memorandum for the Minister" dated 3 May 1961, and attached "Memorandum to the Cabinet."
5. National Archives of Canada [NAC]. Record Group [RG] 2, Privy Council Office [PCO], Series A-5-a, Vol.6176. Cabinet Conclusions dated 1 June 1961.
6. G. Donaghy, "The Rise and Fall," p.80.
7. NAC RG 25 Series A-3-c, Vol. 10057 file: 20-1-2-TANZ, Political Affairs - Policy and Background 26 October 1964-5 November 1965.
8. *Ibid*, pp.81-82. See also DEA, *External Affairs*. Vols.17:2 and 17:5(1965).
9. DEA. *External Affairs*. Vol.17:2 (February 1965), p.70.
10. DEA. *External Affairs*. Vol. 17:11 (November 1965), p.495.
11. Anon. "Canadian Team for Tanzania," *Canadian Army Journal*, Vol. 19:1 (1965), p.27; and Col. H.E.C. Price, "Tanzania Tale...", *Sentinel*, Vol.2:2 (March 1966), p.25.
12. Col. H.E.C. Price/Tanzania Tale...", *Sentinel*, Vol.2:2 (March 1966), pp.24-25.
13. */bid*. p.27.
14. See K. Holbik, and H.A. Myers, *West German Foreign Aid, 1956-1966: Its Economical and Political Aspects*. Boston: Boston University Press, 1968.
15. DEA. *External Affairs*. Vol.27:11 (November 1965), p.495.
16. G/C G.H. Currie, "They Helped Build an Air Force"/Sentinei, Vol.3:4 (April 1967), pp.10-11.
17. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21582 file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. TAN 1750-1 Team Report 2/66, 8.
18. D.M. Rowe, "Economic Sanctions Do Work: Economic Statecraft and the Oil Embargo of Rhodesia," *Security Studies*, Vol.9:1-2 (Winter 2000), pp.254-161.
19. Commonly referred to as the Johnson Report in this context.
20. Other countries seriously considered included Italy and Japan.
21. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol.21582 file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. Message London to Ottawa External Affairs dated 14 June 1966 (Canadian Eyes Only). Info message copy to CFHQ dated 16 June 1966. All subsequent documents cited in this article have been declassified by the NAC, however their original classifications have been noted within the endnotes to emphasize the importance placed on them at the time.
22. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol.21582 file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. Messages No.2468 and No.2538 from London to Ottawa External Affairs (Priority) dated 20 June 1966.
23. The Soviet Union had extended an offer of naval assistance to Tanzania in 1964 during the visit of Second vice President Rashidi Kawawa to Moscow.
24. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1.TAN. 1750-1 Team Report 2/66, 1Apr-30Jun 66.
25. NACRG24.TAN 1750-1 Team Report 2/66, 2.
26. NAC RG24, TAN 1750-1 Team Report 2/66, 2. See also RG 24 CAFATTT TANZ 1750-1 Quarterly Report Apr-Jun 1966, p.4. Initially, the 15 Zanzibar officers who had trained in Indonesia also refused to report for a "junior officer" course, however after a brisk phone call from CDF (Sarakikya) the officers reported the next morning. Throughout the course these officers complained of difficulties in understanding English, even through the USSR, UAR, and Indonesian courses were taught in that language.
27. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. TPDF/3201-5 and TPDF/3525-1 Tanzania People's Defence Forces Report on Monduli Field Training 3 Sep 66- 1 Nov 66.
28. The 3rd Bn TPDF trained from 3-22 September 1966; the 5th Bn TPDF from 23 September- 12 October 1966; and the 4th Bn TPDF from 13 October- 1 November 1966.
29. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. TPDF/3201-5 and TPDF/3525-1, 2-3.
30. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. TPDF/3525-1, Tanzanian People's Defence Forces Report on Monduli Field Training 3 Sep 66- 1 Nov 66.
31. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. File V4760-0043/311 (DI Plans) CAFATTT Quarterly Report Jul-Sep 66 dated 31 Oct 1966, p.4.
32. NAC RG 24, TPDF/3525-1, p.6.
33. Mozambique was then a Portuguese protectorate whose government forces battled with an insurgency group known as FRELIMO.

34. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. CAFATTT TAN 1750-1 Quarterly Report Jul-Sep 66 dated 31 October 1966, p.3.
35. *Ibid.*, p.4.
36. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. V4760-0043/311 (DI Plans) CAFATTT Quarterly Report Jul-Sep 66 dated 31 October 1966, p.3.
37. DEA. File 27-20-2-TANZ No. 592 from Canadian High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs dated 19 December 1966. Subject: Acquisition of Tanks by TPDF.
38. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. Message INT 53483 DEC20/SECRET/FM COMD CAFATTT TO DMDND OTTAWA.
39. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. TAN 1750-1 CAFATTT Quarterly Report Oct-Dec 1966 dated 6 Jan 1967.
40. CAFATTT Quarterly Report Apr-Jun 1966, pp.5-7.
41. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. TAN1750-1 Team Report 4/66 1 Oct 66-31 Dec 66, dated 12 Jan 67.
42. *Ibid.*, p.3. It was suspected that Portuguese patrols from Mozambique had crossed the border to plant the mines and other booby traps.
43. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. TAN 1750-1 Team Report 2/67 1 Apr-30 Jun 67, p.2.
44. DEA. File 27-20-2-TANZ mission to 36 27-20 dated 12 Feb 1968, message from USSDEA OHC Canada in Dar es Salaam.
45. *Ibid.*, pp.2-3.
46. DEA, 27-20-TANZ, message Riddle to P.A.E. Johnston dated 1 April 1968
47. *Ibid.*, p.3.
48. DEA. Message 2-5040-12-85/645 (Secret- Canadian Eyes Only) from Dar es Salaam to Deputy Minister DND dated 7 May 1968.
49. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. Message traffic No. 269 (secret) from Dar es Salaam to London, info Washington and Ottawa dated 3 May 68.
50. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. Message traffic No. 279 (Secret- Canadian Eyes Only) from Dar es Salaam to DEA Ottawa dated 6 May 68.
51. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. Message Traffic from DEA to Dar es Salaam (Secret- Canadian Eyes Only) dated 7 May 68.
52. DEA., 2-5040-12-85/645 (confidential). Memo from Under Secretary of State for External Affairs to DM DND (Mr. J. F. Anderson), CDS CFHQ, and DI Plans on Military Assistance- Costs of Tanzanian Program dated 22 May 1968.
53. *Ibid.*, pp.4-6.
54. *Ibid.*, p.2.
55. DEA. 27-20-2-TANZ No.466 (secret) USSEA to Office of High Commissioner for Canada Dar es Salaam dated 23 October 1968.
56. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. Message No.699 (Immediate) from Dar es Salaam dated 3 December 1968. Nyerere had later indicated that although he had received offers from both Russia and China to develop the air force in the end he felt that Canada would be the best choice for this endeavour.
57. *Ibid.*, pp.3-4. Colonel Sheffield went ahead and also prepared an emergency evacuation plan in the event that he would have to get out of the country sooner than expected. See NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. V4760-034/311 (DI Plans) Emergency Evacuation Plan dated October 1968, updated 1969.
58. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1, DND 1750-1 (TAN) CAFATTT Report 1 Jul 68-31 Dec 68 (secret).
59. NAC RG 24 Series B-2 Vol. 21583, file: S-2-5040-12-85/645-1. Message (secret) from CAFATTT to CFHQ dated 09 May 1969.

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